Reversal in Tanker Markets with Crude trades more robust than Clean

Although tanker rates are hardly booming after being the wall flower last year in the shipping markets, this sector has been consistently outperforming the dry bulk sector this year. This contrast is more due to weakness in dry bulk rates and somewhat better tanker rates than last year. The crude sector is showing signs of strength over the popular clean sector. At the heart of these developments are changes in energy sources and trade flows. 

Not surprisingly, the clean tanker sector has an order book that is nearly twice as big on a relative basis. Asset values were broadly higher in the tanker markets in the first half of 2014, but current values do not support the expected earnings environment The vast majority of tanker demand originates from the movement of crude and residual fuels.

Crude oil marine transportation demand for tankers arises from matching refinery raw materials needs with crude oil production. Petroleum product marine transportation demand arises from matching consumption with refined product production in refining regions. More than 50% of projected growth in demand is forecast from China and India. Energy use in the US and EU has been fairly stagnant for many years. Oil market fundamentals suggest a moderation of crude price increases in the near future in the absence of geopolitical influences. Natural gas is the fastest growing fossil fuel, supported by increasing supplies of shale gas, particularly in the US. 

US domestic oil production forecasted in 2015 to rise to the highest level since 1972. Most of this domestic production is light sweet crudes. A steadily increasing proportion of heavy crudes are being imported to the US driven by growing abundance of domestic light sweet grades. The US is likely to restart export of crude oil, but not for several years ahead. This will be light sweet crude. It will be highly dependent on the prevailing level of oil prices and US domestic politics. Meanwhile, the US Gulf has become a major clean product export hub providing robust volumes of gas oil and gasoline to Atlantic Basin. 

Tanker ton-mile demand is likely be modest over the next few years. Ton-mile demand has been falling in the MR sector. Currently LR freight rates are higher for trading dirty cargoes than clean. Further the MR sector is being cannibalized on longer haul routes by larger LR units. The clean sectors are burdened by heavy supply outlook against only moderate demand growth. The MR’s are under the most pressure with the poorest fundamentals. 

The dirty sector tonnage supply is moderate and demand positive. The VLCC sector faces a large number of deliveries in 2015 and 2016, which creates a neutral freight outlook until the 2018 when some increase is anticipated, assuming new contracting is controlled. Suezmax demand growth is somewhat more positive but dependent on continuing demand for this size in longer haul trades. The Aframax sector has been subject lately to high geopolitical volatility especially with the chaos in Libya but order book situation is more favorable. than the larger sizes, opening more opportunity for rate increases. 

Critical to any meaningful improvement in the tanker markets is a global economy gaining traction to approximately 4% growth needed to underpin the necessary expansion in oil demand and trade. This year, growth projections have been reduced due the poor performance of the European Union with its deflationary policies and China rebalancing with a slowing in infrastructure projects and sorting out losses in the domestic banking system. 

This remains a prerequisite for the freight market to make a return to a moderate level of profitability. Given the number of high profile publicly listed tanker company bankruptcies, the fate of the reorganized companies like Genmar and OSG will turn on when and how soon there will be recovery in the tanker freight markets. 

Earnings margins are likely to remain tight. Trading life of tanker fleets is likely to become shorter. Competitive advantage will come from modern fuel efficient tonnage, good commercial management, and moderate financial expense.

Suspense in the OSG Chapter 11 resolved with remarkable recoveries for both debt and equity holders.

 

OSG has scrapped the original reorganization plan with its lenders for an enhanced plan from its equity holders that involves a larger rights offering, increased from US$ 430 million to an incredible US$ 1,5 billion for institutional investors and a much larger refinancing of US$ 1,35 billion by a record breaking deal from Jefferies in the ‘term loan b’ market as opposed to the US$ 935 million financing from Goldman Sachs. This increased minimum recovery for equity holders from US$ 2 per share to US$ 3 per share whilst repaying debt holders at par. The outcome sets a very high industry bar in Chapter 11 reorganization. 

Both OSG debt and equity holders are large institutional investors and hedge funds. 

Leading the equity group is the Boston-based Brown Rudnick. Among others signing on behalf of the group: Alden Global Capital, BHR Capital, Blue Mountain Capital, Brownstone Investment Group, Caxton International Ltd, Cerberus Capital Management, Cyrus Capital Partners, Luxor Capital Group, Paulson & Co and Silver Point Capital. 

The rights offering is divided into Class A and Class B stock. Any holder than is deemed an accredited investor or qualified institutional buyer is eligible to purchase 11.5 Class A shares or warrants for $3 per security. Each holder that does not fall into one of those categories or choose not to support the plan is to receive one Class B share or warrant per existing share held. 

Jefferies underwrote the ‘term loan b’ facility in four separate facilities and syndicated it to more than 100 institutional investors. Terms on amortization and covenants are said to be liberal, but finance costs are considerably higher than bank finance with spreads of 425 and 475 basis points respectively for its domestic and international fleet. Minimum LIBOR is 1% per annum. Some recent conventional loans have been in the order of 250 basis points over Libor, but these are not companies coming out of Chapter 11 reorganization. Helping to drive the ‘B’ market is a revival of collateralized debt and loan obligations (CDO’s and CLO’s) popular before the 2008 global financial crisis. 

Demand is so strong currently in this market that OceanRig originally planning a ‘term B’ worth US$ 800 million plus a bond issue of US$ 500 million to meet liquidity needs, simply upsized the ‘term B’ facility to US 1,3 billion and scrapped the bond issue. 

Consequently Jefferies may be setting a new trend for shipping companies looking for secured debt that replaces traditional bank finance. 

Where OSG goes after coming out of Chapter 11 is still an intriguing issue. Whilst its US flag fleet is profitable, the international tanker fleet is still losing money. Indeed, OSG recorded a hefty loss of US$ 204.11 for the first three months to the end of June up from a loss of US$ 24,15 million in 2013. Total losses in bankruptcy have been US$ 959 million. The lengthy Chapter 11 proceedings have been very costly. 

Erik Nikolai Stavseth of Arctic Securities seems to share my original views that there remains the likelihood of a separation of OSG’s domestic and international assets at a later stage. Stavseth feels that a pure Jones Act focused company should attract significant investor interest and also put AMSC in play should OSG wish to acquire the 10 MRs in order to obtain control over the vessels. 

It is also possible that the international assets (47 vessels ranging from VLCC to Handysize) will also evolve as a candidate for either splitting up through sales or creating a separate listed entity offering cross-class exposure to both crude and products. These are decisions for the present investors and new management team ahead.

New direction in the OSG Chapter 11 reorganization

Collapse of blue chip OSG was one of the biggest stories last year in the shipping space. OSG management got itself in such a corner, overwhelmed by evolving events, that they were forced into Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings without any clear exit plan. 

Now their options for potential exit are becoming clearer. Unsecured bondholders are likely to be a driving force, making an equity investment through back-stopped rights offering estimated at US$ 430 million. This will be used to refinance OSG lenders under the original revolving credit facility, pay off the IRS claim and give OSG some operating cash to emerge back into business

One of the biggest catalysts of the fall of OSG was their unexpected problems with the US Internal revenue on tax liabilities, but this appears to be heading for a happy end with an agreed settlement for US$ 267 million from the original IRS claim of US$ 463 million even below OSG provisions for US$ 308 million. This is very significant because it resolves one of the biggest sources of uncertainty around OSG and allows them to confront the remaining issues in an orderly fashion. 

Another positive development albeit indirect is the Kinder Morgan acquisition of the American Petroleum Tanker fleet as it sets a market benchmark for the value of their US flag tanker fleet, which is presently their most valuable asset. 

From press reports, the major thrust in the OSG reorganization plan will be a debt for equity exchange with the unsecured bond holders. This will result in massive dilution for existing OSG shareholders, who will be luck to retain about 10% of the company. This appears to be the major source of needed recapitalization. 

The bond and notes holders of distressed OSG debt are likely to have recoveries of 115% and 128-171% respectively, putting the noteholders in an especially profitable position. Conversely, the OSG senior debt holders, who are now mainly hedge funds with lenders having disposed of their debt holding, are likely to be repaid in cash as opposed to receiving any equity. This would certainly be a disappointment for the hedge funds, who bought into OSG debt, depending on their discount entry price.

All this presupposes that negotiated agreements that get OSG out of Chapter 11 are finalized by June this year.

Tail Risk in shipping recovery still very much present!

Lately there is a lot of capital chasing shipping assets, arbitraging on vessel prices.   Oaktree Capital is one of the high profile leaders.  Wilbur Ross was an early forerunner in the Diamond S. venture, doing the Cido deal in 2011.

It has nothing to do with business plans, building value with companies to gain competitive advantage and market share in transport and logistics services. This is pure and crude asset speculation, betting that we are at the bottom of the shipping cycle, vessel values will begin to move up and a quick profit will be made by unloading these assets on the next company, who in turn riding the cycle will hope to gain themselves on the next leg upwards until the last guy in – like a Villy Panayiotides at Excel with the Quintana merger – gets stuck carrying the candle and goes bankrupt with the losses as the market crashes.

My personal view is that Oaktree and others are desperately looking for yield without many options in the present world of ZIRP.  The FED policy under Ben Bernanke’s reflects today's conventional wisdom, trying to push asset inflation to reflate and get out of the current Great Recession aftermath of the 2008 Global financial Crisis.

Shipping assets have caught their radar.  Putting money in risky assets and companies for yield has not always gone very well in past shipping cases.  Berlian Laju, for example, just months after a massive debt restructuring with US$ 200 million in new funds and repeated earlier high cost lease deals ended in debt default just months later, illustrating the risks involved in this strategy.

Whether the present FED policies will ultimately reflate the world economy depends on future real demand for goods and services that generates cargoes for these vessels, pushes freight rates up and then vessel values increase geometrically on the future earning expectations. Until and when this happens, this speculative money is actually generating more over capacity and prolonging any market recovery in the shipping industry.

Meanwhile, we have increasing zombification of many shipping companies like General Maritime now reorganized along with TORM and Eitzen Chemical now renamed Jason, OSG/ BLT are in purgatory with their ultimate fate still in limbo.  Excel Maritime recently moved into a hopefully pre-packed Chapter 11 reorganization.  Genco and others like Eagle are tottering in the brink. The recent Baltic Trading follow on capital raise seems a back door doubling up for Genco - see my recent piece: "Peter Georgiopoulos tries to regain his lost credibility" http://amaliatank.blogspot.gr/2013/06/peter-georgiopoulos-tries-to-regain-his.html.

Their Bankers are desperately trying to keep the dead alive. In turn, speculative capital like Oaktree and others, are buying up distressed debt to keep the banks themselves alive with an increasing number of zombie banks around.  Warehousing of bad assets has become the fashion.  Commerzbank - basically a zombie institution - recently issued a statement that it does expect to sell any shipping assets because they expect the market will bring the prices up...  So why worry about any 'book' losses at current mark to market price levels, capital (in) adequacy, etc.?

Oaktree seems to have a rather chaotic investment approach with different parts putting shipping assets on their books in a rather haphazard way. After all, did it make sense or show good analysis to invest in General Maritime only months from declaring Chapter 11 and needing even more money in a second round?

Normally, investments are supposed to yield value and then second round financing is done to invest in another leg up in the private equity world.  Here Oaktree was doubling down on a bad position, which is not normally good trading practice.  The normal practice would be to lighten up and reduce exposure.  In the current 'pretend and extend' world that we live in, however, everyone is trying hard to avoid cutting losses and many actively practice 'doubling down'. 

Did Genmar ever really have much intrinsic enterprise value as a shipping company beyond its physical assets to warrant the Oaktree "investment" in recapitalization??? I would say no!

Peter Georgiopoulos  never really thought of Genmar as an enterprise - at least in the sense of a logistics transport business serving customers in carriage of cargo.  Peter G. was and is foremost an asset speculator.  He ignored strategic positioning for Genmar to gain market share, improve earnings margins and generate growth through retained earnings. Employment was just a means of holding his assets rather than serving and building a customer base. His biggest sin was ignoring trends in the tanker market and new growth areas. His mindset was on trading assets.  Others like TK Shipping and his nemesis 'Big John" Fredriksen handily outperformed him and provided superior performance to their investors.

In the case of Petros Pappas, the Oaktree approach is to fund Pappas like a bond trader. Pappas has a successful record in asset trading. Oaktree has Pappas like a stock picker in different vessel classes. Pappas trades largely on his own instincts with his own money on a 50-50% basis with Oaktree. His own skin in the game satisfies Oaktree for the moral hazard. Neither Pappas nor Oaktree are looking to build businesses or really have any business plans at all beyond the asset trading.

A recent Tradewinds interview with Lazard’s Head of Shipping, Peter Stokes, sheds a lot of light on this matter. In fact, I am amazed and somewhat gratified to see someone like Stokes, thinking and saying publicly, many of the same things that I have been saying privately and publically when I was recently a keynote speaker at the Hong Kong shipping forum.

Stokes sees two basic scenarios ahead (see "Bungled QE exit could 'burn out' ship values" http://www.tradewindsnews.com/weekly/w2013-06-21/article319083.ece5)):

• Scenario A: - conventional wisdom ‘muddle-through’ recovery in the next few years that is likely to be subpar in quality, partly because of so many trying to ride the coat tails of same scenario.  If everyone is arbitraging, then each is cancelling out the other in any meaningful price action.  Further this self-defeating over time in creating over supply with a new wave of speculative ordering that will grow with any upwards price movement.  There is too much speculative money and too much yard overcapacity.
• Scenario B - complete collapse with another leg down, where investment firms like Oaktree, shipping banks, etc. experience painful and unavoidable losses. The zombie shipping companies finally die. Assets are written down to true values and finally there is a proper shipping recovery based on an industry shake up where only the fit survive: much dreaded Joseph Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’. 

A  preview of scenario B is the recent reportage in Tradewinds about an apparently unsuccessful attempt by Wilbur Ross, First Reserve, etc. to float an IPO in the Oslo capital markets for their Diamond S venture that was built on a huge block purchase of product tankers from Cido a few years.  My previous two pieces on the Diamond S venture make interesting reading in retrospect: 

• "Does the CIDO deal mean tanker values are on the upside?" - http://amaliatank.blogspot.gr/2011/08/does-cido-deal-mean-tanker-values-are.html.

• "Diamond S. a new business model for shipping?" - http://amaliatank.blogspot.gr/2011/08/diamond-s-new-business-model-for.html.

Obviously, the latter Scenario B would be a devastating setback for governments (especially the European Union political elite) and many financial institutions.  Such an outcome might ruin their careers and threaten the integrity of their institutions. On the other hand, they are slowly running out of resources for the constant backstopping. “Pretend and extend” credit policies with the massive socialization of losses is far more costly than they are representing to their voters.  So far little of this has proved helpful to an economic recovery. Only the US has had some relative success, but their boost in energy resources may be a more substantive driver in this tepid recovery than FED financial engineering pulling on strings.

The two key elements ahead that may affect shipping asset prices are the US and its tapering to wind down the FED asset purchases and the Chinese restructuring, given that the Chinese marginal rate of investment is unsustainable and the losses are corrupting their banking system. The US and Chinese both realize that this needs to be done and it is unavoidable, unlike their EU counterparts with their “muddle through” theories, eternal dissention and dream-world mentality resembling Mann’s Magic Mountain novel.

Admittedly, I am strongly influenced by my friend Michael Pettis in China. I believe Chinese growth will ultimately disappoint.  The volatility concerned that Pettis expresses about the very large Chinese speculative position in commodities worries me given the potentially negative impact on shipping markets. So I would not be surprised about Stoke’s concern about further drop in shipping asset prices, driven by lower replacement cost in steel, etc. All this shipping investment is predicated on Chinese growth reflating the markets again – lots of very concentrated risk if this does not pan out.

See "Crunch Time: Why low growth is China's new normal" http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/27/credit_crunch_time_china_low_growth_new_normal

On the other hand, the politicians, particularly the EU elite – our PM Samaras with his never ending Greek success story being the success story of the Eurozone – and Oaktree Capital are really betting the house that the worst is over and there will be happy days again with a robust recovery in just a few months.

Former colleagues of mine like the present Head of National Bank of Greece, Alex Tourkolias, saying that a shipping recovery will lead Greece out of its crisis and John Platsidakis of Intercargo, saying that two years from now the Greek debt crisis will seem like a bad dream gone away are lately exhibiting lots of boosterism.

In Hong Kong, by contrast, the shipping circles were subdued and cautious about a quick recovery in the markets.  Some companies like Pacific Basin have been aggressingly buying newer second-hand units, but these purchases are to renew their fleet and backed against a substantial cargo book, not the kind of overt and open speculation mentioned above by the likes of Oaktree.

So who knows? Stokes and I could be incorrigible pessimists and totally wrong. All I can say is that I still see a lot of tail risk around in shipping and elsewhere.

OSG in the doldrums: Is Morten Arntzen really one of the worst CEO’s in any industry?

Overseas Shipholding Group (OSG) is a blue chip tanker company that is currently in crisis with 13 quarters of operating losses, plummeting share value, rating downgrades (CCC+) and ominously its unsecured bond debt trading far below nominal value. Morten Arntzen claimed in the recent 2nd quarter earnings conference that OSG defensively drew to the maximum its current US$ 1,5 billion liquidity facility. With current market fixation on this facility expiring in February next year to be replaced by a smaller US$ 900 million facility, Arntzen did not provide much comfort to investors. To add insult to injury, Motley Fool named him one of the worst CEO's for the dismal stock performance and sizeable investor losses over the past year.

OSG is one of the oldest US tanker listings. It was founded back in 1948 by the Recanati family and listed in the US stock exchange in 1973. The Recanati are American Israeli with origin from Italy where they took their family name. Two of the Recanati family remain on the Board of Directors: Ariel and Oudi Recanati. Aside from shipping the family has a long tradition in banking and finance, having founded the Israel Discount Bank.

Morten Arntzen became CEO in 2004, coming from a banking background in New York. He ran the global transportation group for Chase Manhattan and Chemical Bank. Then he served as CEO for American Marine Advisers, a boutique NY marine merchant bank group with close associations with OSG and the Recanati family. Arntzen and the OSG finance director, Miles Itkin are mature executives both getting on in age and this is probably the first time that they ever been in an underdog crisis situation. Their strategy so far seems to have been to ride out the storm, hoping for a market improvement rather than making any serious sacrifices. At time goes on without market improvement, OSG’s alternatives get more costly and unpleasant so it is a difficult wager.

On the other hand, with over US$ 2 billion in debt, OSG has considerable debtor leverage. Given lenders accommodative stand towards lame duck shipping companies like Eagle Bulk and Berlian Laju Tankers, a “blue-chip” lame duck like OSG should merit equal or better treatment. This may be a fact that Arntzen is playing strongly behind the scenes.

OSG compared to peer tanker operators was slow to diversify into higher growth alternative marine investments like LNG or the offshore sector with better profit margins. To his credit, Arntzen succeeded early on as CEO in a merger with Stelmar that allowed the group a sizeable position in the product tanker sector in addition to their large fleet in crude oil. OSG’s investments in LNG and offshore have been timid and very conservative. In both cases, they opted for joint ventures and their position is relatively small. In fact, OSG has staked a lot in the US domestic tanker market, which until recently was making losses and limited in prospects.

Under US cabotage, the market is sort of an oligopoly with a limited number of operators, but several of them barely eking out an existence struggling with Chapter 11 reorganization. Lately with the Motiva Refinery project in Houston and US shale oil developments, the US domestic market has started to pick up, but Motiva is now shut down due construction problems.

OSG is counting on substantial MARAD Title 11 money for their US fleet that has been delayed. This subsidized loan money cannot be commingled in their overseas operation, but it is a very valuable resource in an exceeding difficult credit market conditions. Indeed, MARAD created recently some stir by its rejection of rival American Petroleum Tankers' (APT) application for Title 11 loan guarantees despite the company backing from Blackstone.  With the difficult conditions in the OSG international fleet, however, the profit from the US flag operation is unlikely to compensate and cover for the losses even with improved rates.

There is a lot of optimism for a turnaround in the product tanker sector. OSG is concentrated mainly in the MR size with focus on trans-Atlantic trades, but this sector has underperformed expectations. In the end, if new refinery projects come on stream and there is an increase in tonnage miles, it is possible that the LR size will benefit more than the smaller vessels.  Both Blackstone and the Prime/ Perella Weinberg Partners are concentrating on these larger units.  So is Scorpio Tankers, a financially much healthier company than OSG.

Otherwise, OSG share price currently around US$ 5 is not an attractive level to raise fresh equity and this would likely entail substantial share dilution in current Wall Street conditions. A bond issue would be expensive with OSG’s credit downgrade and require security given the current discount on its unsecured bond debt. OSG could sell and lease- back some of their unencumbered units, but this will be very expensive and the lease payments will weight on their cash flow and liquidity. Finally OSG could sell out its share in its LNG and FSO joint ventures.

Is it any surprise that Arntzen stresses over and over again that the tanker markets have reached their floor? He could be correct and in fact OSG 1st quarter results gave some comfort in this direction, but losses widened in the 2nd quarter.

Undoubtedly, it would be a big blow for Arntzen and Itken with their stature and age to be compelled to actual sacrifices, should tanker markets continue in the doldrums and OSG liquidity dries out. I believe, nevertheless, that OSG still has substantial support from its lenders, who will bend over backwards to keep them afloat until better days come.

Whether it is a profitable to own OSC common stock or take a position in its unsecured debt right now is another story. This depends on how quickly one expects a global turnaround in shipping markets. If freight markets remain at present levels into 2013, OSG will face some stressful times.

Are shipping markets heading for another leg down?

Recently private equity group First Reserve bankrolled the Diamond S deal in which 30 product tankers were acquired from ship management company CIDO at a significant premium over prevailing market levels. This speculative spirit reminds me of the General Maritime block deal last year. Similar lust for quick profits of shipping in the early 1980’s led to ill-timed, mispriced major investment decisions and a series of major shipping bankruptcies, and period of severe market disruption. Will the Chinese Eldorado and Fed financial engineering save the day for Wall Street flip-over deals or are we at the end of the 1980’s economic cycle and age of asset inflation?

The major growth driver for cargo demand has been emerging market economies. This year started badly and all sectors are presently suffering. There has been lately some interest in containership and product tanker asset speculation. The only sector really making money is LNG where there is a healthy supply/ demand gap.

Despite the dicey economic environment, the shipping industry staged an unexpected recovery in 2009 and 2010. Dry Bulk benefitted heavily from Chinese stimulus infrastructure projects and commodities stockpiling. Tankers benefitted by oil price arbitraging and storage demand. The container sector managed to reflate demand artificially by slow steaming and then benefitted from a pick-up in Chinese exports.

There is nothing ‘miraculous’ or unique about the Chinese growth model. Well-known China observers like former Morgan Stanley star Andy Xie and political economist Victor Shih at Northwestern University have long maintained that the Chinese growth model is an input driven economy fuelled by cheap money through financial repression to increasingly marginal investments subject to diminishing returns.

Everybody is banking on opportunities of a giant boundless consumer market in China, but as Michael Pettis (senior associate in the Carnegie Asia Program, based in Beijing) has recently written: “Low consumption levels are not an accidental coincidence. They are fundamental to the growth model, and the suppression of consumption is a consequence of the very policies – low wage growth relative to productivity growth, an undervalued currency and, above all, artificially low interest rates – that have generated the furious GDP growth. You cannot change the former without giving up the latter.”

China funds almost all of its major investments with bank debt. It long ago ran out of obvious investments that are economically viable, so any marginal increases in investment must be matched by increases in debt, resulting in an unsustainable debt overhang. Meanwhile, with the US economy at stall speed and the EU imploding into recession, Chinese trade surpluses are no longer desirable with its trading partners.

Rebalancing is not an option for China and it is likely to be very disruptive and for a prolonged period of time. All historical precedents are for a sharp down downturn in economic growth. The decline in Chinese growth will fall disproportionately on investment and this will severely impact the price of non-food commodities.

A sharp Chinese slowdown will have a severe impact on cargo demand and freight rates. The drop in steel consumption from the infrastructure projects will adversely impact the economics of emerging market exporters of raw materials. Liquidity will start to dry up in all emerging market economies. Finally, decline in steel prices will adversely affected vessel values. Scrap prices will fall and replacement cost for new vessels will decline. Vessel prices could drop dramatically.

All shipping sectors will suffer. A recession in the EU and US will quash any increase in demand in the products markets. Emerging markets will not pick up the slack. The larger bulk carriers are very exposed with dependency on China and its steel industry. Container overcapacity will again plague the industry. Recent speculative Greek issues like Boxships and Diana containerships riding on hopes of increased demand for feeder services will fizzle as liner companies reduce their chartered fleet. The most painful aspect will be the drop in vessel values.

In such a scenario, it may take years before any recovery, totally changing speculative business plans and discounted cash flows where time is the biggest enemy to profitability. The nightmare of any short-term player is to be stuck with a losing proposition as a long-term investor. In many cases, the best option is to liquidate in timely fashion not to ride the market down to the bottom. That will be difficult with such a large positions. Maybe this is already being reflected in the recent pressure on shipping shares, even large well-capitalized tanker companies like OSG and TeeKay.

On the other hand, depressed market conditions would facilitate industry consolidation and clean-up of over-leveraged, deadwood companies with failed management. Since the 2008 meltdown, there is a growing list of zombie shipping companies swimming in debt and heavy consumers of lease financing at any cost. This would benefit the financially solid long term players and eventually give them better market pricing power. Lower vessel prices would make the industry leaner and more competitive.

Of course, nobody is a prophet. Next year, we could have a booming shipping markets, a new vessel ordering boom, and the Dow back over 12.000…. Imagine DryShips again trading over US$ 100 per share! George Economou has been a leading advocate of the Chinese unlimited growth story.

Blue chip tanker operator OSG posts big losses

US-listed tanker owner Overseas Shipholding Group (OSG) suffered sizeable losses in the final half of 2010 . The net deficit to 31 December was US $134.2 mio, against a profit of US$ 70.2 mio in 2009. The FFA market currently expects VLCC rates in the low 20’s the next two years, yet equity analyst consensus expectations indicate a recovery of the tanker market. It appears that the analyst consensus underestimated the supply side.

OSG is diversified with both crude and product tanker exposure in addition to its specialized US Flag business. 110 ships are operated of which 43% are chartered-in.

The OSG time charter equivalent (TCE) earnings dropped 10% to US$ 853.3 mio over the full year, due to increased spot exposure combined with lower average spot rates. VLCCs and MRs were most badly hit. Average VLCC spot rates were only $17,000 per day in the final quarter, down from $23,900 in the same three months of 2009. Fleet revenue days decreased 2% or 861 days.

CEO Morten Arntzen said: that 2010 was clearly a disappointing year financially but he pointed to debt reduction, a focus on keeping ship operating costs in check and long term charters for two FSOs operated in joint venture with Euronav as reasons to be more optimistic for 2011. He also said the US-flag business has secured new contracts combined with a lower cost base, which should return it to profit.

OSG has high spot exposure and large fixed costs as almost half of the fleet is leased. OSG will struggle with weak cash flows in a low market scenario the next two years. Like most mature companies, OSG suffers from comparatively low returns ratios.

On the other hand, with its strong financial strength, the company could take advantage of new growth opportunities, something that it very much needs to maintain investor interest by improved profitability. OSG had by the end of Q3’10 cash equivalents of US$ 351 mio and a remaining capex of US$ 375 mio which is fully funded. Total liquidity, including undrawn bank facilities was US$ 1.5 bn. In a weaker tanker market, the company could use the opportunity to expand its owned fleet.

Earnings forecasts in the tanker sector are likely to come down as weak market conditions continue to prevail.