Wednesday, February 25, 2009

NM comes with a discount due transparency issues

In the current investment climate, companies with complex balance sheets are at a disadvantage. Off balance sheet items are an anathema at present. Investors want clarity and unexpected surprises make them uneasy.

Transparency facilitates good stock analysis. Companies with clean balance sheets without off sheet items generally get a premium with investors because they can more easily quantify their risks.

Unfortunately many publicly listed shipping companies are not sufficiently forthcoming on full fleet employment details and many other matters.

NM appears to have significant number of chartered in vessels that can potentially impact solvency. Navios also has a new Greek management who bought out the company in good times, but is untested in the current crisis. Generally Greek managers have less experience and performance has been mixed in freight derivative markets where Navios has a tradition.

These are most likely some of the issues that have led investors lately to sell the company. The future depends on credibility that the management builds with good performance and improvement in general market conditions.


Tuesday, February 24, 2009

DRYS: three scenarios in the perils of Pauline

Dryships (DRYS) is struggling to raise US$ 500 mio additional capital at market prices. About half the money has been placed. This is a tactical victory that led one analyst recently to upgrade his recommendation. Some estimate that this new money could keep the company afloat for 2009/2010, but the jury is still out and there is a lot in play. DRYS is undoubtedly one of the most exciting listed shipping companies.

As DRYS writes in its prospectus, further market downside could result in its shares losing 'most or all of [their] value'." What are the major risks in DRYS at present:

1.) How soon and at what prices the remaining half of $500m equity issuance is wrapped up? Right now DRYS is trading below US$ 4 per share. If this trend continues, this equity infusion will have diminishing returns. In any case, the offering is looking very dilutive for existing shareholders.

2.) Whether DRYS's charterers pay on time and in full and the dry bulk market stages an impressive turnaround? Whatever period charters DRYS may have, if the market stays sour, its free cash flow will be impacted negatively by additional charterer defaults, renegotiations, redeliveries and lower rates on renewal.

3.) How much further DRYS's lenders are willing to bend on principal repayment terms? DRYS certainly has plenty of proverbial debtor's leverage but the banks are being pressed for solvency and to clean up their loan portfolios. So far so good, but patience may come to an end.

Ole Slorrer of Morgan Stanley sees three scenarios: Bullish case: US$ 30 based on earnings multiples of 15 and a V-shaped market recovery, base case: US$ 6 based on earnings multiples of 10 and muddling through supported by expectations of an eventual silver lining in the dry bulk market and the oil rig business and worst case: US$ 0 based on further charterer defaults, prolonged weak market, and lenders' decision to foreclose.

One of the most interesting assets in DRYS is the Ocean Rig acquisition. DRYS is planning to spin it off later this year. If successful, it could boost share price. Another possibility is that DRYS sells off the company as a sacrifice sale to raise cash and deleverage for survival. A more pessimistic version is that Economou sells DRYS to a financially stronger competitor.

Nordea who is the principal lender in the Ocean Rig acquisition is a veteran shipping bank. If they determine that DRYS will not be a survivor, they will be very adept in liquidating the company. George Economou is also a veteran in default negotiations with creditors from his bond issue debacle in the late 1990's.

Whatever the outcome of DRYS, it is fairly certain than its CEO will retain his private shipping interests in Cardiff and be a shipping market survivor.




Thursday, February 19, 2009

Navios (NM) revisited: Setbacks in latest quarterly earnings from non-transparent transactions

There is more than meets the eye at Navios (NM). Investors needs to keep a careful watch on management decisions and balance sheet results. Management performance in the near future is critical.

In a previous analysis, I have commented on the complexity of the Navios (NM) balance sheet. My views have been cautious on this company. I feel justified in the latest NM earnings announcement.

Soaring expenses and large exceptional costs saw annual profit dive. Losses on warrants, swaps, doubtful accounts and newbuilding cancellation fees eroded a much-improved sales figure to leave the bottom line 56% down year-on-year.

The company continues to take on debt. NM revealed a total of $353.5 mio in debt financing “with favorable terms in difficult credit conditions”. The new deal includes a 10-year term deal for $120m secured at 60% of original vessel values to be used to partly fund the purchase of two Capesize newbuildings. There is also a three-year $33.5 mio convertible loan to partly fund another ship purchase and a $200 mio two-year revolving credit facility “for general corporate purposes”. This has to been seen in context of off-balance sheet items.

DnB NOR Bank shows NM with significant financing needs in 2009 and a shortfall of US$ 270 mio yet to be covered.

The rewards in NM are not without some risks.

Diana Shipping (DSX): discipline and prudence pays off in a bear market

Diana (DSX) stands out as one of the most conservative and prudent players in the dry bulk sector. They kept strict rules on fleet expansion and debt levels in the boom times. They maintain good corporate governance rules and transparency with shareholders. They have a competitive advantage over many peer companies.

Simos Palios, CEO of DSX, is an old shipping hand in the Greek community with a successful investor track record. Palios has always had outside investors in his private company prior to moving to capital markets.

His public company DSX has strict corporate governance rules that exceed most peer companies in quality. Keeping with this spirit, DSX has a CFO with multinational corporate experience. Unlike many peer dry cargo companies, DSX is very straightforward on fleet employment, maintaining full details on the company website.

DSX maintains a conservative chartering policy and currently has it fleet 90% contracted with a diverse group of charterers.

During the boom times, DSX refrained from massive block fleet expansion deals. The company prudently financed fleet renewal by taking profits and selling older units and replaced them with newer units. Its newbuilding orderbook is small - only two Capesize on order from 2006 at fairly decent prices. Its debt load is very moderate.

DSX is well positioned to expand its fleet at bargain prices, but not likely to make big moves.

Very bearish dry cargo analyst, Martin Sommerseth Jaer, of Oslo-based investment bank Arctic Securities, singles out DSX as one of the few companies in the sector where he feels confidence.

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

More charter party defaults at Excel (EXM)

Excel Maritime (EXM) is under further pressure from counter party risk problems. Its remedies are limited. It is likely to have to live with the problem until market conditions improve.

EXM argued strongly to its investors that one of the strong points of the Quintana (QMAR) merger was the heavily contracted employment profile. QMAR scaled up in 2006 with a massive vessel purchase deal from Metrostar that was backed with Bunge employment. The market in 2007 outperformed all expectations and QMAR's stock rose but the company free cash flow benefited only very mildly because of the conservative employment profile. This led QMAR shareholders to market the company for sale.

EXM paid a substantial price but they reasoned that QMAR's charter contracts would improve their secured coverage of their existing employment profile.

Presently EXM is understandably very vexed about accepting charter renegotiations. I have always argued that in bad markets, legal remedies are only a partial fall back. It all depends on the charterers capacity to pay and other employment opportunities available (which diminish as market conditions get worse). If the charterer is not solvent and risks bankruptcy, there is really no legal remedy. Owners often have a vested interest to assist their charterers in these situations. Each charterer relationship has to be viewed on its merits.

The most important thing in a bad market is to keep the vessels moving. Often voyage charters are safer from a credit risk standpoint, but this requires strong chartering and operational skills as well as a sufficient fleet size.

Bottom line: EXM probably did not sufficiently price the risk factor in the M&A deal. At the time, vessel pricing was virtually free of risk discount. The break even levels were far in excess of the industry median, which is a natural fall back level in this highly cyclical business. The secured employment was only a partial hedge with counter party risk.

This acquisition was heavily financed by senior debt so any shortfall in free cash flow from charter party renegotiations could potentially raise problems in servicing debt.

QMAR was wise to sell out and partially cash in their profits at the time.



Monday, February 16, 2009

Climbing the wall of hope in the dry bulk market

Visibility in dry bulk remains low despite recent market activity. Is this just a bear rally or the beginning of a sustainable recovery? Clearly those most heavily invested in ambitious asset expansion plans have been feeling pain lately and have the highest hopes.

Given the credit crunch last fall in the financial meltdown and problems with letters of credit, there has been a lot of inventory drawing. The Chinese had build up their coal and iron ore inventories last year and have been actively in price negotiations with key commodity suppliers for lower prices. This has finally led to replenishment and cargo movement in the dry bulk sector.

Longer term it remains difficult to forecast the timing and impact of various government's 'stimulus' plans, especially infrastructure projects, on the dry cargo market. Many feel that shipping rates will stay subdued.

The issue is how long the bear market will last. The longer this goes on, the more severe financial strain on dry bulk shipping companies and risks of contract defaults/renegotiations as well as defensive action from senior lenders.

The shrewdest players were those like Corbin Robertson, who partially cashed in their holdings in the sale of QMAR to EXM. The weakest are those who overexpanded with very high asset prices and leveraged up at rates beyond the capacity of the company free cash flow. This did not prove a sustainable strategy for creating shareholder value.

Dry bulk was always a speculative business. Presently it is ideal for for risk-loving investors fueled by hopes and volatility-loving day traders!

EGLE: Expansion woes in a bear market

Eagle Bulk (EGLE) may continue to have good long term prospects, but it is clearly feeling the pain of its unfortunate timing decision to expand and leverage up at top of the market asset prices.

EGLE is now facing the consequences of its massive fleet expansion at the top of the dry bulk boom. It is suffering from reduced profitability and high debt. New charters appear to be ranging between $8,500 to $10,500 per day, which is reducing free cash flow and making it harder to service debt. General and administrative expenses have risen considerably on latest company estimates, impacting negatively on profitability.

Cantor Fitzgerald and DnB Nor Bank have recently downgraded the stock to 'sell'.

I have differed from other GLG analysts on EGLE, primarily out of my concerns over the consequences of their massive US$ 1.1 billion deal with Alba. This ambitious expansion prior to the substantial fall in rates is causing them a lot of grief. Order cancelations expose them to forfeiture of deposits and losses.

On a positive note, however, EGLE still appears to hold a significant part of a large financing facility and its financing needs appear covered in 2009 and 2010 for its order book. On the other hand, steel prices have fallen considerable and is likely to lower future replacement cost of new tonnage and impact negatively vessel values.

Of course, EGLE is not alone. Many of its peers are suffering from similar problems or worse.

The outlook ahead depends on the efficacy of various government 'stimulus' plans on the dry bulk market, particularly infrastructure projects.