Sunday, January 25, 2009

NAT: a listed tanker company with radically different business strategy for investors.

NAT has consistently outperformed all other publicly-listed peer shipping companies. On ten-year basis it has returns of 1065% as opposed to the nearest competitor with 150%. Contrary to its peers, NAT avoids term debt and operates mainly on the spot market. It is also avoided massive scaling up asset expansion deals. It has maintained high dividend payouts to shareholders.

Shipping is a cyclical business and there is no free ride by shifting counter party risk to time charterers.

Success in the business comes from sound business principles such as brand image, a solid customer base, strong chartering and operational capacity and vessel performance quality. Good timing decisions are crucial in profitability, particularly asset acquisitions at moderate prices.

Whilst an attractive method of multiplying returns, bank leverage often creates restraints on commercial policy, impairs liquidity and increases financial risk.

The main reasons why so many recently listed shipping companies have done massive vessel acquisition deals is that they boost nominal investment returns as well as investor expectations. On the other hand, these deals result in increased leverage and exposure to losses, if asset values fall decline thereafter in weak market conditions, charterers default or renegotiate rates and orders are canceled.

NAT was never under any pressure for massive scaling up deals. Their cost structure is lean and efficient with lower operating vessel operating costs than many Greek operators. They maximized profits in good markets with spot rates.

They are in a competitive advantage with their charterers over many of their peer companies. They had no obligation to fix their units on period cover because of financial covenants or investor demands. Charterers normally prefer the flexibility to fix on shorter periods that correspond with their own business plans. For longer periods, they demand steep discounts for the risks. There is always the underlying counter party default risk in bad markets.

NAT has negligible term debt and excellent liquidity. They are now on the winning side to increase their fleet at bargain prices that further enhance their competitive advantage in the market place.

DRYS revisited

Do expectations for DRYS match up with reality? Does the DRYS BoD provide adequate shareholder oversight? Recently there have been several major transactions between DRYS and private companies controlled by the DRYS CEO. In just a few months after entering these transactions, they have resulted in substantial losses for the company.

Despite high expectations and a recent recovery in share price from a low of US$ 3.04 to an early January high in excess of US$ 16 about 10 days ago, DryShips recently issued a press release bracing investors for a net loss of up to US$431.4m in the fourth quarter. The company shares are now trading in the region of US$ 10-11.

Much of this expected loss relates to one-off payments for the cancellation of vessel purchases and disposal of a trio of capesize newbuildings. The decision to axe the purchase of nine capesizes from Economou’s Cardiff Marine could also erode the bottom line.

There is also an unrealized mark-to-market interest rate swap loss of approximately US$177m. Finally there is discussion of a possible write down associated with the Ocean Rig acquisition.

These losses can be classified into two categories: 1.) Risky asset acquisitions from CEO's private company to DRYS and 2.) risky business decisions outside of core business with a major impact on the group as a whole.

Shifting assets between a company that is privately held by the CEO to the publicly listed entity that he manages raises a number of issues. On a positive side, perhaps the CEO is using the private company as a business incubator and the public entity as the financing tool. On the other hand, there are questions about BoD oversight, especially concerning risk management and financial losses so soon thereafter.

The transactions between the public and private entities have been done through stock, debt and cash exchanges. The order cancellations that have led to the losses have been negotiated with cash, stocks and warrants between the respective entities. This makes evaluation difficult and does not assist with transparency.

The offshore diversification into deep water offshore drilling merits some attention. This is an activity that is new and totally outside the purported business of DRYS as a dry bulk cargo transport. It entails huge asset investments in offshore drilling platforms that dwarf the investment in the dry bulk vessels as well as significant increase in debt leveraging of the group. The CEO's private company has been heavily involved in developing this business, too. The results of this operation will have a major impact on the future of the company. Whether this activity can be spun off as a separate listing depends very much on future conditions on Wall Street as well as future expectations for this sector now that oil prices have fallen below US$ 50.

On the market upside DRYS was an outperformer with strategies that outpaced peer companies. So far on the downside, it has been a rough ride.

Saturday, January 17, 2009

EGLE: Conflicts between sound business principles and Wall Street 'value-building' concepts

Short-term Wall Street objectives can conflict with longer term goals to build a sound business. Being solely a vessel-provider and relying on a customer base of a limited number of charterers can lead to a high degree of counter party risk. High dividend pay-outs secured by time charter employment comes with a price as there is a trade-off to building value by a broader commercial base and a higher cost of funds for growth. Expansion is necessary to build up a company but buying deals from others with a mark-up is not always the most productive means to create business with value.

Eagle Bulk has been generally a well run business. The timing of Sophocles Zoullas was very good to enter the market and start this business. He chose the most conservative sector of the dry cargo market where there is the need for more industry consolidation and tonnage renewal was indisputable.

The weaknesses of the investment proposition are in the massive scaling up at premium asset prices and the vessel-provider model, out-sourcing the commercial side to time-charterers without trying to build some presence with end users. Admittedly there are established groups in this sector who do have their own contract base and direct relations with end-users, but this only adds to the weakness of the investment proposition as far as the commercial aspect is concerned in the competitive landscape. The company shifts rate risk to charterers at a price but it cannot escape counter party risk in adverse market conditions. Further EGLE chose to scale up at the peak of the market on the basis of these charters.

According the latest 'Tradewinds' article, the company does not give out the names of its charterers. This is not helpful to investors in assessing counter party risk. 'Tradewinds' states that an October 2007 loan agreement with RBS shows four Dwt 53,000 units and nine Dwt 58,000 units going on charter to KLC, which is now staving off bankruptcy and renegotiating rates. The question is whether these are charters on actual vessels under EGLE operation or new buildings to be delivered. Further EGLE has recently taken steps to cancel a number of its newbuilding contracts.

The Wall Street firm, who backed Zoullas with investment funds, was strongly oriented to time-charter income. EGLE had little option but to try to build up their company with time-charter employment. Further they had to maintain high dividend payments to satisfy their investors. This capped their earnings in the strong markets that ensued. It prevented them from moving into the operational and commercial side of the business and kept them at a distance from end-users. It also left them with limited free cash flow for further asset acquisitions, forcing them to raise additional capital and leverage up into order to expand their fleet.

Whilst US financial firms stress 'value' in their investments, I never understood how buying a deal like EGLE did in 2007 from Alba Maritime did much in that respect. After all Alba placed the orders for the bulk carriers and - according to 'Tradewinds' - even negotiated time charter employment with KLC, which is now struggling to avoid bankruptcy, that they passed on the EGLE as part of the deal. EGLE could have considered doing something similar themselves. Instead they bought the business from Alba and paid them a handsome profit as a US$ 1,1 billion deal. The scaling up did inflate expectations and share value for a while, but was this solid business building? Time will tell.

Now in this weak market, EGLE has been obliged to cancel a number of new building contracts. KLC is looking to renegotiate down the charter rates for their own survival. For the time being, Eagle has a limited customer base with counter party exposure in the aftermath of a large scaling up at high asset values. In the end, it depends on the strength of their charterers to carry the existing contracts in this difficult market.

It is not any easy situation for any dry bulk owner ahead.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

OCNF - The perils of shifting market risks to counterparties: pros and cons in time-charter employment

Time-charters are helpful in securing cashflow, but they are not an absolute panacea for investors and bankers. Shipping companies retain performance risk. There is normally a hire adjustment annually on actual speed and fuel consumption as a opposed to the notional figures in the charter party agreement. If the vessel is in any way not fit for service, hire payment can be suspended. In bad markets, Charterers have increased bargaining power given the scarcity of employment alternatives for Owners. Charter rates can be negotiated downwards. This is risk for all shipping companies currently as long as this downturn persists, especially in sectors like dry bulk and containers where the underlying freight rates have fallen to very low levels and Charterers may be under financial pressure.

As TradeWinds reported Monday, OceanFreight suspended dividend payments in an effort to preserve capital and to possibly jump on new opportunities. Notably the company reported that its 70,000-dwt August (built 1996) will now fetch a lower rate of $16,000 per day, down from $42,100, on an existing three-year charter.

Given the current low spot rates, many listed shipping companies face the potential risk of renegotated charter rates as the market weakness persists. As an example, TOPS bought a number of bulkers at the top of the market in 2007, which they put on period time charter to cover the premium paid in the prices. EXM entered into a sizeable merger deal in the fall of 2007 at premium price levels with Quintana, who had many units on time-charter. This was heavily financed by bank debt.

Both Natasha Boyden of Cantor, Fitzgerald and Scott Burke of Oppenheimer downgraded OCNF. It was not clear whether they were more influenced by the dividend cut or the charterparty renegotiation.

Time-charters are very different from lease-model employment. Often investment presentations are misleading on this matter. Owners must maintain the units to specified standards, provide crew and supplies and are liable for related agency expenses. If the vessel cannot perform for Charterers, they have the right to suspend charter payment. If vessel performances are overstated, charterers can make claims on the vessel. In case of Charterer insolvency, Owners are obliged to deliver cargo and often to settle the unpaid voyage accounts that are Charterers' debts.

In weak markets, Charterers frequently request hire reductions. Owners are often obliged to accept these reductions for lack of other employment alternatives.

Chartering companies are a margin-based business. They may occur losses if underlying voyage results are lower than their hire obligations, making it difficult for them to carry the vessel. Charterers demand increasing discounts for the length of the charter for the risk and uncertainty of carrying the vessel.

Banks and financiers often make unrealistic and commercially imprudent demands on Owners to employ vessels on long period time charters to cover dividends and loan payments. This may result in poor risk assessment as well as impair Owners' business plans in creating shareholder value.

In any case, employment profile must be carefully assessed for each company on a case by case basis.

Monday, December 15, 2008

DryShips: Intercompany transactions, management style and potential moral hazard

US equity analyst Natasha Boyden of Cantor Fitzgerald has called "punitive" Economou's price for allowing Nasdaq-listed DryShips to cancel an order for four panamax bulkers slated for purchase from his Cardiff Maritime. In DryShips, George Economou holds the positions of CEO, CFO as well as Chairman of the BoD. 40% of DryShips is held by insiders and owners. Economou appears to have a predominate role in BoD appointments. SEC rules apparently give DRYS their blessings. Indeed it is frequent practice that major US corporations are run by friendly BoD's with close connections to management in similar fashion. This system reduces diversity in decision-making and limits shareholder rights even for major institutional investors. It appears that there is a high risk of moral hazard in this type of management and BoD structure.

George Economou frequently initiates transactions in Cardiff, his private shipping group, that he passes on to DryShips. This allows him to move quickly to enter into new business. It creates a compensation mechanism between his publicly-listed company and his private group. At a later stage, he obtains DryShips BoD approval and DryShips assumes the financing as well as the ultimate profits and liabilities of the business at a marked-up prices. These are acceptable Wall Street business practices.

In a rising market, this has benefitted greatly DryShips, which has out performed nearly all other conventional listed peer companies in P+L results. Now under present market conditions where there are serious prospects of sizeable losses, these methods open questions should the possible losses fall on investors in the public company from these transactions. Already DRYS has rolled up some substantial real losses in one such transaction and there is risk of loss in another.

Just a month ago, the DRYS BoD approved a controversial deal to acquire nine Capesize units for US$1,17 bio (in cash and shares) and two drill ships from companies reportedly under Economou control.

Now DRYS has forfeited a US$55 mio deposit to cancel the purchase of four bulk-carriers on a previous intercompany deal. DRYS has paid out an additional US$105 mio taking its total outlay on the deal to US$160 mio. All four bulkers appear to be from an Economou order at Shanghai´s Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding.

TradeWinds
reports that Economou paid around US$36 mio each for the earlier units and US$50 mio each for the two later ones, at an average cost of around $43m apiece. They maintain that Economou has thus essentially recouped that cost with the US$40 mio per vessel DryShips has paid to date.

Natasha Boyden, an analyst a Cantor Fitzgerald, raises serious questions about the deal, which saw the company pay $105m for purchase options on the vessels, which are reportedly owned by interests associated with Economou. She said: “We believe the terms of the cancelation are punitive and this transaction, in combination with the nine capesize deal in October 2008, raises serious questions in our minds as to the ability of DryShips to finance further transactions.”

The question is how major investment banks will advise their clients on risks in investments like this case.




Tuesday, December 9, 2008

TeeKay LPG Partners (TGP) and its prospects

TGP is a spin off in Wall Street fashion the last few years. OSG and FRO have also done spin-offs. In this case, the parent company is very much in control.TK is a major world player in the tanker sector. They shun the VLCC market. Their concentration is Suezmax and Aframax units. They are also active in the product sector. The gas business is a relatively new segment of their operation, started in 2004. TK is also in the offshore business. In TGP, their concentration is in LNG units and secondarily LPG units (mainly small vessels on order). They have combined this fleet with a flush of 8 Suezmax tankers.

The LNG market traditionally has been plagued by excessive expectations. The saving grace is the high entry cost and needs for operational expertise that keep the number of players restricted. Nearly all the vessels are on long term charter. The spot market is very small but expected to grow to about 30% of the fleet over the next five years. The charterers are major oil companies so counterparty risk is minimal. The spot market is small.

LNG ships are immense capital investments. The LNG industry is based largely on a series of virtually self-contained projects made up of interlinking chains of large-scale facilities, requiring huge capital investments, bound together by complex, long-term contracts, and subject to intense oversight by host governments and international organizations at every state of the process.

Global LNG demand and demand projections generally remain strong, with base case demand projected to grow by more than 70% from 2007 to 2012, and supply projected to grow by more than 80% over the same period. Average annual trade volume growth to 2012 is 9% for low case, 12% for base case, and 16% for the high case scenario. In the short term, the limiting factor on LNG trade continues to be tight supply. LNG supply project development might be slowed down by this financial crisis. The large amount of new liquefaction capacity is scheduled to come online in 2009-10 and there is danger of excess supply, hopefully of short duration but subject to the fall out of the current economic mess, plunging energy prices and spreading recession.

2008 will set a new record for LNG tanker fleet growth, with 55 or 56 newbuilding deliveries. Most 2009 delivery slots are filled, and yard capacity is becoming tight for 2010 deliveries as well. We can assume moderate additional ordering of up to 4 million m3 capacity (20 vessels) for delivery in 2010, and slightly more for 2011. These are exceptionally difficult contracts to cancel.

So far tanker rates have not suffered the catastrophic plunge of the dry cargo and container sectors. In fact, tanker rates are currently firming with seasonal demand. The LNG/ LPG rates are also steady. What has plagued the sector and particularly TNG is inflation in operational expenses (crew costs and repairs). Whatever the external environment, most of TGP’s fleet is contracted on period rates with escalation provisions for operating costs. Also important is financial expense with their large capital commitments. TGP management seems to have done a good job in containing these expenses and planning their FCF; but in the current financial turmoil, this is an area of risk.

Last August, S&P dropped Teekay’s corporate credit rating from “BB-plus” to the next lowest rating of “BB”, signalling that the company faces major long-term uncertainties but is less vulnerable in the near-term. Not unexpectedly, it is the LNG and Offshore business that is the major source of this debt due enormous capital requirements.

In TGP, there is both bank debt and lease commitments. TGP has a very conservative employment profile matching the debt obligations with long-term employment contracts with first-class charterers. They also have negotiated a very good debt profile as well as covered their financing needs for their newbuilding commitments. They seem to have reasonable margins for debt coverage obligations and in any case, it is less likely that these specialized units will be prone to the same collapse in value as commodity tonnage like bulk carriers. The real risk in asset depreciation is the thin resale market especially in distress situations should the contract commitments be impaired – which is the case for all specialized tonnage.

All in all, TGP has an attractive fleet, good employment and management. Shares are trading at very low levels. The major risk is the impact of the financial crisis on future product demand, especially in view of the fall in energy prices. It is also a potential M&A candidate given the entry barriers in the sector.

EXM and debt covenants after the QMAR merger - conflicts between Wall Street IPO structuring and longer term business-building

Capital markets have brought substantial benefits to Greek Shipping. Quintana was a successful dry cargo startup that was sold at a very good time. The business model suffered from the restraints of capital market IPO's, but it was very well managed within these limitations. IPO investor strategy is generally very short term. There are substantial conflicts between the investor appeal and creation of a sound business. The acquiring firm Excel Maritime EXM is now facing the longer term challenges of establishing a sound business. Its first priority is to deal with the high leverage from the LBO in the face of substantial decline of asset prices and a dismal freight market.

Quintana was the ideal combination of commercial and financial partners. The major driver was a well-established US coal trader, who had an existing relationship with a major private equity firm.

Shortly after some initial bulk carrier purchases, the company launched an initial IPO. Some months later, the company entered into a massive scaling up operation, acquiring a large fleet. They chose to finance this with a PIPE offering investors discounted share price to buy into the operation. The issue was structured with high dividend payout against long term employment. Growth was achieved largely by financial engineering rather than free cash flow and commercial market penetration, which would have certainly taken longer.

Timing proved auspicious and the market in 2007 sharply exceeded expectations. Share price rose in excess of actual earnings and FCF. QMAR reaped less benefit in the P+L than share price. The fleet was on fixed rates albeit with some profit sharing. Typically the time charter earning were a fraction of the prevailing spot rates; whilst operating expenses were rising sharply with the boom times.

The major shareholders put the company up for sale to cash out. They got attractive terms from Excel Maritime with a nice cash payout and exchange of shares in Excel, accompanied by BoD and management positions. In turn Excel financed the deal with heavy debt finance. Currently EXM is said to being carrying US$ 1,6 billion in debt.

Currently Excel must manage this debt in severe market downturn and sharp fall in vessel values.

There are real conflicts between Wall Street desire for quick profits and sound business principles. The challenge is to reconcile these conflicts to build a sound business.