Heart Surgery - Ode to shipping industry.

I was over the weekend in ICU at Asklipeio. Two days.  Indication was bad: Clogged arteries 99/70/50% and immediate bypass surgery. I am trying urgently to go to surgery for bypass.  The doctors initially urged me to contact Olympic Maritime, where I used to work for a place at the Onassio ASAP.  They have shown little or no interest in my case at least so far. It works like a private hospital. I am on the waiting list at the Ippokrateio for surgery.  Like every public hospital , they want to see my case and then I go to the waiting list. 

I am losing ground with the arteries and lack of proper oxygen in the blood.  How I was normal and healthy just a few weeks ago was a miracle given the advanced condition.  I had a triplex and blood tests in October with very positive results. 

Last night I had significantly worse angina attack in terms of pain, this time to shoulders and back and in terms of duration.

This ordeal with my health reflects much of my disappointment and frustration with the shipping industry over the years.  I have never had many really productive relationships.  The shipping industry has been a bad experience for me. 

This is the cost of getting involved in the shipping industry that started with Thanasis Martinos and later with the Onassis Group.  It was my choice and responsibility.  I always wanted to be active, creative, responsible and productive. But it never really brought me the happiness, well-being and satisfaction that I wanted.  Lots of disappointment and unhappiness.

Maybe things will change, but I have no reason to be optimistic, provided that I survive my health ordeal.  

 

  

 

Stopford - Covid and Climate Change: Two big challenges to the Shipping Industry

Yesterday listening to Martin Stopford's interesting presentation in a Capital Link event and lengthy Q&A session, it seemed to me that the two major drivers of events shaping the shipping industry today are Covid and Climate change.  They have a number of similarities. They have far ranging effects on world trade and ship technology that will affect the future.

Covid crisis and climate change start with natural phenomena that have morphed into highly contentious political issues due human response to them and the ensuing politics involved, particularly in the EU and US. 

Viruses and microorganisms are as old as life on the planet.  New viruses appear all the time.  Coronaviruses are well known and this is a new strain of this existing family.  We have had virus outbreaks from China repeatedly in the past years like SARS and H7N9.  Nobody panicked  and eventually these new strains took their course through natural means with human immunity and some efforts for vaccine,  Vaccines are simply an artificial means reinforcement of human immunity systems that would otherwise develop antibodies in reaction to exposure to the virus.  Ultimately there is no other way to deal with viruses.  The human race would have long ago become extinct from viruses if there were not biological immunity systems.

What is startling in the case of Covid is the political response to it that was first initiated in China by mass lockdowns/ social distancing of the healthy population and economic shutdown of production. Historically quarantines in reaction to infectious diseases were done by isolating sick people from the general population and holding travelers from infected areas for a certain period before entry into national territory.  

The Chinese government shutdown had an immediate effort on the shipping industry with a reduction of port cargo movement of 20% on the average, affecting the container industry negatively, forced to blank sailings and facing box build ups in Europe from the imbalances produced by the factory shutdowns in China.

Then there was an even more damaging and recessionary impact on the shipping industry with Western Governments collectively adopting the Chinese lockdowns and imposing them on their populations, quarantining large segments of their healthy population in fear of exposure to the virus, something never done before in human history.  

This has caused a great deal of instability for global shipping. There are projections of significant reduction in world trade this year,  Ship operations have become challenged due difficulties to carry out surveys and repairs. Normal crew changes have become a major problem to carry out .  Economic impact varies by sector.  

• Container shipping was looking to recover with Chinese reopening of factories and increase in port cargo volumes in March, when it got slammed by the recessionary impact of the lockdowns in Western economies that created even deeper losses of revenues and blank sailing. Major container lines have been plagued by poor earnings margins for years.  Some were just beginning to turn profits in 2019.  Now all these major liner companies are likely this year to go back into operating losses.  Stopford feels they will eventually muddle through this, depending on the speed that Western government reopen after lockdown and the severity of the global recession.  Stopford feels that large containerships were always a problematical response to the structural problems of the industry.  Globalization is over after Covid and trade is likely to evolve more regionally.  The use of these units will be restricted and the transport needs will be more for regional distribution.

•  Conversely the tanker sector has been enjoying a bull market with record rates.  This in related to failure of OPEC to extend production cuts and a new price war, when at the same time Western mass lockdowns have provoked a significant drop in oil demand.  The system is flush with oil from overproduction.  This has resulted in a surge of demand for tankers both for transport and storage, even backing into product carriers from refinery overproduction.  Ironically this situation will eventually result in obligatory and severe cuts in oil production and a dead tanker market with fewer hydrocarbon cargoes ahead.  Stopford pointed to the inherent weakness of the tanker sector in his presentation.  For now the tanker companies are the darlings of investors and flush with cash and profits.

•  Dry bulk is more mixed and nuanced here.  This sector has not been very profitable for at least 10 years, except for short rate spurts in certain segments.  The large bulk carriers depends on the steel industry,  coal and iron ore cargoes.  This segment had an awful first quarter with BDI indexes going into negative territory. Stopford does not see a very bright future here for these units with a maturing Chinese economy and the likelihood of stimulus spending to be more focused on technology rather than further infrastructure projects.  The smaller units will fare somewhat better. Panamax units carry more diverse cargoes like grain that are driven by other factors than the steel industry. The smaller sizes carry a much wider range of cargoes, including minor bulk trades.  More of this is related to foodstuff and general population needs. These segments will muddle through the crisis but present rates are low.

Stopford sees a secular trend towards regional trading zones with production closer to consuming areas.  He outlined three recovery scenarios.  All this is related to Western governments and how they manage the reopening of their economies.

This is entirely a political issue and it will have big effects on the depth of any recession. The drop in world trade will be milder than drop in GPD, but the effect on the shipping industry will be far reaching.

I see this as complicated political issue, not directly related to the virus. Western governments have taken unprecedented actions imposing drastic restrictions on their populations and curtailing basic civil liberties like freedom of assembly and religious worship.  All this together with significant social and economic cost on their populations that has led to the specter of global recession.

Scientific studies are beginning to indicate that there is nothing novel about this virus.  Infection rates on general population are much higher than originally anticipated despite the lockdown measures.  Death rates are much lower than wildly inaccurate early studies from places like Imperial College.  There is no easy way for the political class to reopen quickly.  They are fearful of the future political cost of their actions.  How this unfolds in the US and EU depends on the boldness of the political leadership and their effectiveness to return to normalcy and limit damages by getting their populations back to work and reflating their economies with the stimulus programs.

Despite the three scenarios, Stopford closed with a hopeful note that by fall, most of this Covid crisis will be over.  We shall see!

Climate change and environment regulation has taken the back seat due Covid crisis but this is a similar case of politics overwhelming natural phenomena and creating considerable challenges.  The earth has underdone significant changes in climate for millions of years. Anthropogenic causes by burning hydrocarbon fuels are a very recent phenomenon.  Carbon is essential for life on the planet.  There is a natural recycling of carbon from plant life back to oxygen.  Science is even more divided over these matters than Covid and human immunity systems.  The climate depends on so many other unquantifiable factors such as solar radiation and tilt of the earth.

But the present political consensus like the massive Covid lockdowns is that carbon is bad and greenhouse gasses GHG must be reduced and eliminated.  IMO has adopted GHG targets for 2030/ 2050 for which there is presently no technological means to comply.  The EU dominated by Northern European Green parties wants even more drastic measure such as a carbon tax trading scheme imposed on the shipping industry.  Like the Covid lockdowns, these measures will have negative economic impact on their populations, particularly the poorer classes.  There have been mass protests like the Gillets Jaunes in France in reaction to government taxes on fuel, just as in the US there are increasing protests against the government lockdowns. But generally the political class stands firm on these matters and it is not easy for them to back down in terms of their positions for the political cost.

For the shipping industry, Stopford points out that diesel and fossil fuels are far more efficient technologically than alternative fuels.  There is much higher energy content in the fuel.  It can easily and safely be stored on vessels and it does not take much space.  For these reasons, Stopford feels that diesel propulsion is the only alternative for the next generation of ships with a lifespan of another 20 years. 

The innovations in shipping for less fuel consumption and GHG levels will come from 'smart' ships with messages via CPU modules replacing wires, as Stopford puts it.  I would add this would also dictate more use of digitalization and software maximization programs in the offices linked to the vessels that they manage.  Metis - a Greek software system -based on the internet of things is a good example and a number of leading Greek Shipping companies have adopted it.

Stopford then outlines a growing use of LNG and dual fuel vessels. New technologies like this are more easily implemented in short sea shipping in early stages. Already this is the case for use of LNG in the cruise industry and tanker feeder vessels in Europe, for example.  This will lead to a new generation of vessels that will start to replace the  'smart' diesel/ fuel oil vessels. 

Then rather far out, Stopford sees electric vessels with fuel cells powered by hydrogen, etc. None of this is close to reality today.  The fuel cells cannot produce sufficient power and the new fuels presently can  only be produced from processed that create GHG that must be sequestrated.  Many of alternative fuels are noxious and difficult to store on vessels.

It is very intriguing to note that the same political class that supports decarbonization and vigorous climate change regulation also support with passion the mass lockdowns in reaction to the Covid virus  Many are extolling the positive results from the mass lockdowns on the environment with the drop in air and land transportation and falling demand for hydrocarbon fuel. They are the ones most critical to attempts to reopen economies and get people back to work. They are advocating universal income guarantees and green new deals for stimulus as long term solutions. 

They are not keen to return to the status quo.  They are not particularly troubled by adoption of  restrictions of movement and civil liberties on the general population. They tend to be indifferent to empirical scientific method and how it may evolve over the particular ideology that they promote to support their policies and actions.  They are not especially concerned about the social cost and economic hardship on the general population from their decisions. They place more important on their longer term ideological political goals that they feel are good for society and their political careers.

We will see in the next few months how this political debate evolves and how soon we reopen. The political climate is looking toxic and divisive. Inevitably we are entering a new post globalization era for the shipping industry with far reaching consequences.  Stopford parallels the challenges as analogous to the transition from sail to steam in the 19th and early 20th century.  The political and economical ramifications are huge.

How long will this bull tanker market last?

Despite looming global recession, the tanker sector has been enjoying a rate boom from the oil price war and failure of OPAC+ to agree on rate cuts.  This market boom comes at a time of falling oil demand. The tanker market is being driven by ramped up production. The present large contango in pricing favor physical oil storage, further reducing tanker supply and keeping tanker charter rates very firm.

Many of the major listed tanker companies feel that the tanker industry has entered a new era and will finally be enjoying several years of good earnings.  Frontline's MacLeod characteristically sees floating storage as a 'generational' opportunity.  What is the incentive for build up oil inventories even with wide contango when oil demand is falling in a looming global recession? Is this bull run sustainable and what are the risks for tanker share investors?

There are substantial risks that this could be another false start for the tanker industry, sooner than later.  Even if there are no agreed on cuts in the near future, present production seems so out of proportion to falling oil demand that available storage space is filling up rapidly.  There is the risk that at some point, the storage space will be so tight and expensive that production will have to be physically reduced.  At that point, the tanker market could become frozen for a period with very little demand for oil transport and refineries drawing off oil stocks.

More likely agreed production cuts will come sooner than later and contango spreads will narrow. Negotiations failed this week 15 because Russia and Saudi Arabia are insisting that non OPEC producers like the US and Brazil join in the production cuts. In the US environment, voluntary production cuts are almost impossible legally.  Sooner or later, production cuts seem inevitable.  Physical oil storage has never been sustainable over the long run.  

Maritime consultancy Marsoft predicted in a recent webinar that a significant oil supply cut of Opec, Russia and nine other producers – also known as the Opec+ group – will end the bull runs in tanker markets from July onwards.  Marsoft partner Kavin Hazel estimates that a reduction between 5m barrels per day (bpd) and 10m bpd would pressure tanker rates later this year.  This would lead to a much smaller stock buildup and less floating storage. A rise in oil price from production cuts would narrow the contango spreads. Tanker rates would fall back more significantly in the second half of the year with less oil put into the market.

This view was recently seconded by Cleaves Securities,  who turned bearish and are projecting that Oil Tanker spot rates plummet in concert with asset and share prices. Their tentative VLCC spot rate forecast for 2H20E is now only US $ 15k/d, which is extremely low given 4Q represents high-season, in a tanker note yesterday.

The clean sector also faces challenges with dropping oil demand in  recessionary environment. The jet fuel market, for example, has collapsed with the fall in air travel.  Refineries are trying to change their product output mix to compensate for the collapsing margin spreads in these products. Excess jet fuel can be stored, but unlike crude oil, there is a limited shelf life and the product become off specification and can no longer be used as intended.

At least the tanker markets profitable and building up cash.  Other shipping sectors are not so fortunate with container lines and cruise business burning cash and struggling right now. Dry bulk is showing some improvement but just above water at present.

These are complex matters, but the most worrisome presently is falling global oil demand and depth of the coming recession. The timing and shape of a coming global recovery is critical here. It all depends when the quarantines are lifted and how soon we return to normalcy.

Performance Shipping wipes slate clean

The company, previously known as Diana Containerships, bought the remaining shares back from Kalani Investments.  This marks the end of a major transition for this listed subsidiary of Diana Shipping, Inc.

I was never a fan of the original concept to enter the containership segment and purchase speculatively containership assets.  This a popular fad at the time with dry bulk companies.  Paragon did the same thing and it was also a failure, along with Paragon that was completely run into the ground.  The CFO, who understood the issues, quit and moved on.  Investors lost their money. 

Diana had better management,  It has weathered many storms, but it has never been a block buster for investors.  Dry bulk has been a tormented sector for many years now.  None of the listed companies in this sector have been very profitable.  Many have disappeared.  Some like Genco has undergone bankruptcy and restructuring.  Eagle was bought out by distressed asset investors.  In comparison, Diana has been a survivor.

Moving from dry bulk to being a containership provider company to liner companies was always a weak proposition with challenges even more daunting than dry bulk.  So why waste money and management time?  Better to focus on what you know and try to maximize it.  As I remarked at the time, Simos Palios could never replicate Gerry Wang at Seaspan at the time.  He lacked to mojo for this.

One has to give credit to Simos Palios and his management that they did not leave their subsidiary to fester as in the case of Paragon.  They took steps to deal with the problems and transform the company to something better.  They were also aided by luck as always needed in these entrepreneurial decisions.  Moving to crude tankers, they had some success.  Tanker markets are booming now with the low oil prices with extremely good freight rates.

The Kalani involvement was out of financial necessity at the time, but now the company is past this and in a position to redeem the preferred shares involved. 

Performance Shipping is clever renaming of the company.  It puts the emphasis for investors where it should be: good earnings results in profitable sectors.

Alternative fuels and scrubbers

The only present realistic, technically feasible alternative fuels for IMO 2030/ 2050 carbon emission targets are LNG/ LPG.  All alternative fuels have drawbacks over conventional diesel fuel in terms of energy density, storage requirements and safety.  

The most likely future scenario is dual fuel engines with capability for LNG for the next generation of ships.  All the major marine engine makers - particularly Wartsila and MAN - are ready for this.  Longer term it is likely there will be a range of fuels depending on size and trade of the vessel.  

The scrubber story has fizzled out with very small fuel spreads and drop in fuel prices.  Technically scrubbers are an absurd option:  

• You are burning dirty fuel with heavy residues over a cleaner fuel LSFO that is better for the engine with less wear and lower maintenance costs.
• You have to maintain and operate a complicated exhaust cleaning system that leads to higher carbon emissions from the main engine as well as additional maintenance costs, risks of breakdown and a burden on the crew.

The only motivation was cheaper fuel costs, which presently is nearly zero differential.  Turning off the scrubbers is a no-brainer and scrubbers are a stranded investment for the time being. Obviously, publicly listed companies like Star Bulk and Scorpio tankers, who have been selling the scrubber story to their investors argue that the fuel differentials will widen and their decisions are justified.  Time will tell.

The companies that held back on scrubbers like Euronav or installed them selectively upon charterers request and share in expenses like Safe Bulkers and Danaos have been justified and shown as more prudent management for their shareholders.

Coronavirus has changed dramatically all forecasts for shipping markets.

Covid 19 is now in a second stage, destabilizing the major consuming economics - US and EU - and unleashing a major global economic crisis of the magnitude of the 2008 meltdown.  It started in China and spread to other Asian countries in the first stage.  China, Singapore and Korea seem to have managed successfully the initial health crisis and contained the contagion, so that people have returned to work, but the problem is that export demand is now under threat due the second stage where the virus has now led to lockdowns that have incapacitated large sectors of the US and EU economies,

In the meantime, a price war has broken out between Saudia Arabia and Russian and oil prices have fallen dramatically.  These low prices threaten the US shale oil industry and many lead to more woe in the offshore sector that was showing first signs of some recovery after a prolonged slump for several years now.

We can make the following observations:

•  The best case recovery scenario is a U-shaped global recovery in the 2nd half of 2020 but lots of output destruction in the 1st half.  Hopefully better years in 2021 and 2022.
•  Scrubbers that seemed a major success story in January this year are now rendered problematic with the low oil prices and very small prevailing spread between LSFO and HSFO.
• The impact on this situation on shipping varies with the sector:

Containerships were badly affected by the factory shutdowns in China, now with the factories coming on stream they face the second wave that is reducing import demand in the US and EU.  Liner companies will face a new bout of financial stress with the weaker liner companies again in jeopard with serious cashflow problems. Likewise, third party vessel provider companies that have legacy debt problems.

Drybulk started the year with very low rates. The Capesize sector was very badly hit and still suffers.  There has been some recovery for the other sizes, but mixed.  

Tankers are experiencing a boom market with the low oil prices, but the first surge in rates has now abated, albeit rates are still very profitable levels. Both crude and products trades are currently profitable. The contango price curve favors liquid storage. With a looming recession, a lot of crude oil and oil products will go into storage.  Reduced oil demand from a prolonged economic slump would jeopardize the current profitability of the sector.   

The severity of this major global recession depends heavily on the ability of governments to contain the virus and get people back to work to restore normalcy.  The most successful cases seem to be Singapore and Korea in this regard.  Whether the US or EU can replicate this success remains to be seen.

The US government is particularly concerned about the need to restart their economy and get people back to work but they are just in initial stages in dealing with the health problems.  The EU is struggling over reflation mechanisms that are lacking in the Eurozone. The health crisis in Italy and Spain is still out of control.

Scrubbers revisited.

Back in October 2018, I published on this blog a somewhat negative article on scrubbers as a means of compliance for IMO2020 regulations.  Today we are close to finishing the first month of IMO2020 in full implementation.  I think it opportune to revisit this subject in view of the experience to date with these regulations now in force.

I always saw scrubber refitting as speculative by nature depending on fuel differentials.  I never liked the concept of making a ship a factory to remove sulphur from heavy residual fuel oil.  I considered direct use of compliance low sulphur fuel oil from the refineries as a more efficient solution.  Also I believe in a level playing ground for the shipping industry and scrubbers create a tiered market for the vessel segments where they are widely used.

In fact, the initial fuel differentials have been much wider than initially forecast.  The actual fuel price spreads are well above projected levels to support the scrubber investment.  This has made the prime movers like Scorpio, Star Bulk and others the winners and substantial beneficiaries on the initial scrubber wager. Indicatively, Okeanis VLCC's are earning a staggering US$ 121 m per day as scrubber savings kick in.  The Greek shipowner says it has already made back 44% of the retrofit bill for its big tankers.

Further scrubber refitting is proving to be an excellent asset play.  Close to 20 modern or resale VLCCs are being touted for sale at high prices in a market that is offering shipowners strong returns.

Looking ahead, we do know yet whether fuel spreads may narrow.  The high differentials may be simply a product of the supply disruption in initial market conditions. Over time, the prices may normalize to lower levels.  Fuel spreads may drop significantly.

One issue to be resolved is the matter of the continued supply and availability of traditional heavy residual fuel oil.  Refineries have ramped up production of low sulphur fuel oil and are earmarking HSFO for other uses than marine fuel.  A smaller supply of HSFO and tighter availability may result in higher prices and also storage issues for the smaller quantities in the market for marine fuel.  Already it is reported that there are availability issues for supply of HSFO in the Far East and ships forced to Singapore to bunker heavy residual fuel oil.

In any case, the scrubber school is presently at the top of the shipping world as the winners in this debate. Some are thinking about monetizing their position by selling the scrubber-fitted units at a premium, but this depends on willing buyers and nobody knows how long present fuel spreads will remain of whether fuel spreads may narrow.

Furthermore, dry bulk rates are very weak and tanker rates are falling, so regardless of whether the vessels are fitted with scrubbers or not, the earnings margins are not improving.

Postscript: Fuel spreads have now collapsed with the dramatic fall in oil prices.  Plans for scrubber installations are now facing massive cancellations, particularly in the dry cargo and containership sectors. We will see in coming quarters whether the wagers made by companies like Star Bulk and Scorpio Tankers pan out in earnings results for their shareholders.

CMA-CGT merger with Ceva and its challenges

The Ceva merger is a milestone for CMA-CGT.  It represents an effort to move away from a transport provider business model to a logistics operation, in hopes of creating more value content to services sold and better earnings margins for shareholders

The liner industry has been through years of stress.  This is related to many years ofovercapacity and intense competition sending box rates to very low levels, despite China entering the WTO and a global trade boom with a massive rise in volume of container traffic on head haul routes to Europe and the US for finished goods.

The liner industry has basically exhausted any possible way of improving profit margins within its present business model as transport provider to freight forwarders.

• Initially there was an attempt to move to large tonnage to defend earnings margins by lower unit costs.  The industry moved to Panamax size to post-Panamax for the huge 10.000 teu plus vessels that are employed on head haul routes today.  Whilst this process created a cascading of the small older tonnage to other routes. Every liner company was obliged to follow suit to remain competitive in the alliance system. Financially weaker operators resorted to chartering larger units from vessel provide companies, who could carry them on their balance sheet against the period charters. None of this provided any sustained relief with improved box rates and better earnings margins.  The larger units and cascading generated more overcapacity in the process.
• The Global Financial crisis in 2008 created substantial trade disruption that put all the major liner companies in massive losses.  |Defensively the major liner companies resorted to slow steaming for lower fuel costs and soak up as much tonnage overcapacity as possible.  This mitigated the operating losses and provided some reprieve. Eventually slower speeds became a norm in the liner industry.
• It did not prove to be any game changer, however.  Eventually two major Korean lines - Hyundai and Hanjin - had serious financial problems leading to debt restructuring and the bankruptcy of Hanjin.  The Hanjin bankruptcy helped rebalance the industry. There was a revision of the alliance system to three major alliances.  For a brief period there was some improvement in box rates with this industry consolidation.
• IMO2020 and higher fuel costs is a tremendous challenge to the liner industry.  The liner industry has been the most proactive shipping segment to deal with these challenges.  All the options are painful.  Using compliant low sulphur fuel requires securing in advance necessary fuel supply to support continuation of liner service without disruption.  Fitting scrubbers on larger container vessels is an expensive CAPEX investment and means the immobilization of the significant number of vessels for refitting. Use of LNG requires new building orders for another generation of container vessels.

Last year there was a partial recovery for some of the liner companies, but others remained with operating losses.

After the 2008 GFC, CMA-GGT nearly went into bankruptcy.  They were compelled to take on a Turkish partner for fresh capital.  Only recently last year did CMA-CGT start to generate again operating profits.  This despite a merger with APL and moving operations to Singapore.;

The CEVA acquisition is an major attempt to revise their business model.  But CMA-CGT remains with a weak balance sheet and the merger execution is a major financial challenge for them.  They are looking to divest of their terminal business to raise cash to complete this merger.  CMA-CGT has also ordered a new generation of LNG powered containerships.

CMA CGM is saddled with US$ 20 bio debt and serious liquidity issues.  They must get a grip on  their debt and improve  liquidity in 2020 or CMA CTGT may have to restructure its balance sheet, 

Meanwhile the liner industry faces further challenges.  The Chinese economy is maturing and China is moving to slower GDP growth.  Trade patterns are changing.  Trade is becoming more regional.  Production is moving closer to consumption areas.

The general containership outlook remains bleak.  Box rates are likely to remain low. Older vessels may be subject to extraordinary value depreciation.  We have seen this before with container vessels even younger than 20 years going to scrap.

The only bright side is improved supply-demand balance in interregional trade and better time charter rates for old Panamax vessels and smaller containerships.

More Aegean woes

Latest from Lloyd's List:

Aegean Marine Petroleum Network has laid out its findings to date from a lengthy internal investigation by its audit committee and it does not make pretty reading for shareholders of the New York-listed company, with up to $300m of company cash and other assets now held to have been “misappropriated” through fraud. 

I met some Glencore management, who run their fuel oil business from the Chemoil merger, just last week at a conference in Athens. They alerted me to the fact that despite so many months since the Mercuria take over, the company was still a mess and there were no published accounts.

We will see whether the US authorities will intervene on the fraud charges related to the receivables. Usually this goes nowhere and the shareholders simply lose their money.

I never liked this set up from the initial IPO. This is reflected in my previous blog articles. The company was very badly run in a difficult and low margin business with a lot of debt against receivables. That was an unsustainable and high risk business Strategy.

Since the initial IPO, I have consistently advised countless institutional investors to stay away from ANW.

Mercuria have the financial and operational means to turn this around but it will need a lot of restructuring. IMO 2020 is going to be a revolution to the fuel supply industry and likely to change the credit terms with the substantial increase in fuel costs.

The scrubbers conundrum

IMO 2020 is a daunting challenge for the shipping industry. After initially a long period of ‘wait and see’ with considerable verbal resistance to retrofitting their ships with scrubbers, there is a sudden rush since June this year of companies jumping on the bandwagon to retrofit their fleet with scrubbers. Whether over time this proves an effective means to meet the environmental challenges ahead for the industry remains to be seen. It is likewise questionable in terms of the interests of the shipping industry as a whole. 

The IMO 2020 regulation places an impossible burden on the shipping industry. Normally environmental regulations on matters like exhaust emissions start with the engine makers and refining industry, not with the end users of the equipment. 

Here the shipping industry will be monitored and fined for exhaust emissions from not using compliant low sulfur fuel oil (LSFO). The existing fleet is equipped with engines designed to burn heavy sulfur fuel oil (HSFO). It not clear that the refining industry will be able to supply sufficient LSFO. The refinery industry is not mandated to do this under IMO 2020. They do not know themselves how much HSFO will continue to be used and how much LSFO will be needed. Changing the refinery cycle to produce LSFO requires investment. Also possibly this will necessitate change of supply chain for crude oil in favor of lighter crude grades more amenable for production of LSFO.

None of the means of compliance for ship owners is guaranteed to be without risks, expenses and issues. 

• Scrubbers are an exception in the IMO 2020 legislation that allow ship owners to continue to burn HSFO in their engines. No one knows for how long the regulatory authorities will continue to permit this exception. The technology is based on land applications in heavy industries like power plants. Scrubbers are heavy and expensive equipment. The residues from the process have a disposal issue. The process requires additional energy and has maintenance costs. Fitting scrubbers is a costly capital investment in the millions of dollars per vessel as well as requiring off-hire and expenses for installation. The CAPEX may be recovered in the operation of the vessel with cheaper HSFO but no one yet knows how much the price differentials will be between HSFO and LSFO and how long or soon will be the payback. The growing sentiment for scrubbers at least for larger tonnage comes from fear of being left out with charterers, who will give preference to vessels that can burn the cheaper HSFO. Some major oil company charterers are offering period charters at substantial premium to current T/C rates for vessels fitted with scrubbers. 
• Burning compliant LSFO will have considerably higher costs than previously with the HSFO. Nobody knows whether there will be sufficient supply. Ships could be forced to wait for supply and be immobilized. There are no clear fuel standards. There are technical and safety issues in burning LSFO in conventional engines built to run on HSFO. 
• LNG is prima-facie an elegant alternative but this practically can only apply to new buildings since the costs of refitting existing vessels with new main engines is simply not practical nor feasible. The major oil companies are preparing to supply LNG for fuel but so far availability is only at a few major ports and use of LNG as fuel is only feasible regionally in ECA areas like the Caribbean, Northwest Europe and the Baltic Sea. With LNG, there is another potential environmental issue with methane slip, where there might be future regulation. 

Lately in the Trump administration in the US, there is growing concern about the impact of higher transportation costs to consumers from IMO 2020 and talk about finding some means for delay in implementation of IMO 2020. Since these regulations have been ratified many years ago, the general feeling is that delay in implementation is not too likely. Simply, 2020 will be a tumultuous year in the fuel business and there will be considerable lenience until supply issues are settled. 

There will be three categories of vessels: 

• Those fitted with scrubbers, mainly larger vessels with higher fuel consumption that perform long haul voyages. 
• The modern ECO vessels without scrubbers with low fuel consumption. • All the other vessels available. •
• Smaller vessels will be the least affected. Many of them are burning mainly gasoil distillates, trading in ECA’s. They are too small physically to fit scrubbers.

A key issue for the shipping industry is the incidence of the higher fuel costs – on the ship owners or on the charterers? The shipping industry is a very low margin business with some sectors like tankers making operating losses. Already fuel costs are mounting this year with the rise in oil prices internationally. The liner companies are posting fuel surcharges. Already some are starting surcharges for IMO 2020. The shippers are protesting but given that this sector also is low margin and low making, there is not much to protest or otherwise more liner company bankruptcies. 

My view is that the shipping industry would be best served to boycott scrubbers and force the higher fuel costs on the charterers, letting the politicians face the regulators over the higher costs to consumers for use of more expensive fuel. Also slow steaming is a constructive measure that reduces emissions as well as oversupply of vessels for better utilization of the existing fleet. 

The shipping industry, however, is highly fragmented. Shipping companies have no market pricing power. They are price takers. Essentially it is a highly competitive, low margin business with low returns on assets and investment, except for market swings and asset arbitraging. 

2020 will be an interesting year. There may be a silver lining in term of more cargo volume, especially in the product tanker sector to supply LSFO and generally lower supply of vessels with increased scrapping pressure on older, less fuel efficient tonnage and vessels taken out of the market for scrubber refitting.

How IMTT/ MIC compares to the major international players like VOPAK and Oil Tanking.

The Macquarie Group (MIC) made a strategic decision in 2014 to acquire International Matex and enter into the liquid storage business. Liquid storage is an international business dominated by VOPAK and Oil Tanking both with a global presence of terminals in key hub locations, either direct investment or in joint ventures. Generally the share performance of MIC has disappointed compared to VOPAK. They are very different business models. 

MIC owns, operates and invests in a portfolio of infrastructure businesses in the United States.

The heart of MIC is International-Matex Tank Terminals (IMTT). IMTT has ten marine terminals located on the East, West and Gulf Coasts and the Great Lakes regions of the United States, and two partially owned terminals in the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Newfoundland.

IMTT has a dominant market position in the New York Harbor and lower Mississippi River, which are two key port areas in the United States. 

IMTT enjoys approximately a one-third market share for bulk liquid storage in the NYH (the largest terminal), and has approximately two-thirds market share on the lower Mississippi River with the St. Rose, Gretna and Avondale, Louisiana facilities. 

They compete in the liquid storage business with Royal Vopak among others. VOPAK is the world’s leading independent tank storage company. They have a 400 year history and operate a global network of terminals located at strategic locations along major trade routes. MIC management is a relative newcomer to the liquid storage business, buying an existing operator with a 70 year history.

MIC entered on the surge of the US energy renaissance with increased domestic production. They have focused on the US regionally. Whilst liquid storage is a major part of MIC, their focus is portfolio investment in infrastructure and IMTT is only one of four business segments: 

• Atlantic Aviation: a provider of fuel, terminal, aircraft hangaring and other services primarily to owners and operators of general aviation (GA) jet aircraft at 70 airports throughout the U.S.
• International-Matex Tank Terminals (IMTT): a business providing bulk liquid terminals, 
• MIC Hawaii: comprising an energy company that processes and distributes gas and provides related services (Hawaii Gas) and several smaller businesses collectively engaged in efforts to reduce the cost and improve the reliability and sustainability of energy in Hawaii;
• Cntracted Power: comprising electricity generating assets including a gas-fired facility and controlling interests in wind and solar facilities in the U.S. 

MIC had major earnings miss in February and reported that its free cash flow would likely decline by between 8 and 10 percent in 2018. It announced cutting its dividend by 28%. This resulted in a major share sell off over 40%. Since then its share value has not recovered significantly. In July, MIC entered an agreement to sell their Bayonne Energy Center for US$ 900 mio with a net proceeds of US$ 650 mio of which US$ 150 mio will be used to reduce their revolving credit facilities. MIC has a BBB- credit rating by S&P. 

MIC has had a public dispute with MOAB Capital over debt levels and executive compensation. This happens in these cases of disappointing investor results. 

VOPAK operates 66 terminals in 25 countries. It concentrates entirely on the liquid storage business. It has an AAA- credit rating by S&P and a much more consistent earnings results and dividend history than MIC. 

The liquid storage business has had its challenges the last few years. Much of this has to do with declining occupancy rates in oil storage, which a major component for both IMTT and VOPAK. Oil storage is very sensitive to price arbitrage and oil futures. In backwardization pricing environment, there is little incentive to store oil. This year the rise in oil prices has restored contango and a better environment for storage. 

Fuel oil remains an unsettled market with impending implementation of IMO 2020. The fuel importation market looks promising with structural deficits. VOPAK has invested heavily in LNG/ LPG storage in anticipation of future growth demand. IMTT has largely ignored this sector. It has a much larger exposure to refined products than VOPAK, which has a more balanced mix of products. MIC is investing in a US$ 225 mio program to repurpose and reposition IMTT, leveraging IMTT’s privileged position to respond to market changes and capitalize on growth opportunities. By comparison, VOPAK is spending end maximum EUR 750 million on sustaining and service improvement capex for the period 2017-201 as well as an additional EUR 100 million in new technology, innovation programs and replacing IT systems including terminal management software in the US with the latest in cybersecurity. 

I have always considered VOPAK a much better managed business than MIC. Of course they have different approaches and they are not entirely comparable. VOPAK is a dedicated international liquid storage provider. IMTT is a major part of MIC, it is a US liquid storage provider. MIC is invested in other infrastructure projects beyond liquid storage.

Brookfield buys into TeeKay Offshore

TeeKay Offshore Partners (TOO) has been an industry leader in the shuttle tanker and floating storage business. It most direct competitor is Knutsen Offshore, more recently listed but an established operator with Japan’s NYK as partners. Although the offshore business is under stress, shuttle tanker are on long term employment, there are entry barriers to the business and the assets are in limited supply. TOO has recently struck up a new business partnership with Brookfield Business Partners - a new dominate shareholder - that rewrites their balance sheet. This ring fences TOO liabilities for parent TeeKay Corp and makes TOO a formidable player in the marine offshore infrastructure market.

Latest 1st Quarter financial results for TOO showed profits of US$ 15 mio and distributable cash flow double that amount. Both the shuttle tankers and the FPSO floating storage business were profitable. There were no Auditors remarks. These were better result than a year ago 1st quarter 2016, when they had some small losses, most likely from asset impairment charges. Their bank leverage is on the high side (70%) but not yet to the point of breaching LTV covenants.

What destabilized TOO was the generally poor business climate and concerns about possible future difficulties. The catalyst for this was last June when their Lenders sold some US$ 75 mio of the company's secured debt in the secondary market at a discount, reportedly at levels between US$ 0.75 and 0.85 on the dollar.

This precipitated a panic in the share price and spiked over to the parent company TeeKay Corp. It was all about future issues, not  present liquidity issues that risked possible insolvency. There was the matter of future asset values for very specialized assets in a narrow resale market. Oil rig assets in recent distressed sales have lost as much as 60-70% of their value. There was the matter of future contract renewals. In fact, TOO was recently obliged to renew at reduced rate one of its FPSO contracts. Queiroz Galvao Exploracao e Producao. Finally, there was the impact on TeeKay Corp struggling itself in the currently beleaguered tanker market.

The situation was an opportunistic investment for Brookfield Business Partners with a capital injection of US$ 610 million. Brookfield is taking a 60% stake in the company. TeeKay Corp retains a 14% share in the business, injecting a smaller capital amount of US$ 30 mio. Brookfield is also taking a 49% stake in the general partner and providing them an intercompany loan of US$ 200 mio, allowing them to restructure their debt and extend maturities.

They are planning to separate the shuttle tanker business from the offshore floating storage and placing an order for four additional shuttle tankers.

Brookfield is reputedly a low risk investor, seeking 15% long term returns, which is a realistic target in the shipping industry. Given the general situation in Offshore and uncertainties with low oil prices, etc,, it may take a few years until recovery but there is a fair likelihood that the curtailment of new offshore projects the last few years will lead to shortages as older fields like the North Sea are depleted and new projects in the future.

Odfjell acquiring Georgiopoulos chemical vessels to be delivered and taking the commercial management of the delivered vessels in a common pool.

When Peter Georgiopoulos jumped on the band wagon back in 2014 and moved into the chemical tanker sector with a speculative order in China and establishing Chemical Transportation Group, it was clear that the MR/ handysize stainless sector was clearly going to be over invested and rates would disappoint from the excess capacity.  I have mentioned this in a prior post: Is Peter G’s sudden foray into chemical tankers a clear signal to short the sector?  http://amaliatank.blogspot.gr/2014/04/is-peter-gs-sudden-foray-into-chemical.html.

Peter was a chemical tanker outsider with no knowledge of the industry and a career of speculative asset plays. Peter G is essentially an asset trader with mixed reputation on operating profits. He has made some very good asset plays and had also some very bad calls resulting in disastrous hits for his investors that crashed into bankruptcy and reorganization like Genmar and Genco.

Now we see Georgiopoulos monetizing half of his chemical fleet and breaking off from his pool managers, Hansa Tankers, to a new pool with Odfjell, who already has Celsius Tankers backed by Breakwater as clients. This appears a wise move on his part. Doubtful that he is making the profits that he expected but then he walked into a sector of the market where he had no experience.

Chemical tankers have had traditionally poorer returns on asset than any other shipping sector. It is small market that is only 3% of the entire tanker market. Stainless steel chemical tankers are expensive, specialized assets that only a few can operate efficiently because of the parcel nature of the cargo lots and the need for a contract base with end users. The vessels are often built to order for the needs of the major operators. It is generally a very narrow resale market where the best contenders are a handful of peer operators. It is difficult to time the sales because the vessels are committed to contracts and cannot easily be freed up. Because it Is a relatively small market size, it does not take a lot of ordering to flood the market with over capacity.

A great deal of ordering has been motivated by the shipyards. In this particular cases, Ding Heng in China wanted to develop a niche market reputation for handysize stainless-steel chemical tankers. Building a stainless chemical vessel is much more difficult than an LPG carrier. In the case of LPG vessels, the cargo tanks are pre-fabricated by the manufacturer and then mounted into the vessel by the shipyard. LPG vessels only have a very few cargo tanks. In the case of stainless steel vessel, the cargo tanks are many and they have to be built into the vessel. This work is very costly and requires skilled welders that know how to work with stainless steel. It can also result in painful, loss making contracts for novice shipyards with higher construction costs, unexpected delays and performance problem.

The Italians built the last generation of stainless vessels back in the late 1990’s under state yard subsidy schemes. They were replaced in part by a new generation of vessel with Marine Line coating built speculatively in Turkey. None of these vessels built every made much money for their owners from these two periods of ordering binges.

The Japanese have been very successful in building high quality clad stainless vessels with very standardized designs without room for modifications. They are supported by domestic Japanese owners, who then time charter them on a long term basis to the major operators like Stolt, Odfjell and Tokyo Marine. These are very reliable cookie cutter designs of good quality.

The above major chemical tanker operators are a ‘defacto’ industry oligopoly. The entry barriers with the end users for major contracts are substantial. They create base cargoes for which profits come from the completion cargos on the spot market. As in any competitive, relatively low margin business, the major operators are best served with a mixed fleet of chartered and owned vessels, where they can add and subtract tonnage according to market conditions. Speculative owners are very much price takers in this process.

Georgiopoulos tried to soften this by turning to Hansa Tankers in Bergen, Norway for pool employment. Hansa was a break off from the collapse of Bryggen Tankers where one of the partner, Hans Solberg, decided to go on his own. Hans Solberg has built up a very impressive commercial/ pool management business in this sector with an impressive roster of clients, comprised of some major Japanese names, some institutional investors in the sector like Princimar and Greek operators like Interunity and Georgiopoulos who moved into the sector a vessel operators without chemical tanker commercial management skills. Commercial management in the chemical sector is a lucrative business.

Currently, the chemical markets are weak. Last year was not a good year and this year is proving difficult. The Odfjell move makes sense and is no surprise as part of the inevitable chemical tanker industry consolidation process. You have a major chemical tanker operator partially absorbing a novice operator as well as undercutting Hansa commercial management and poaching the existing Georgiopoulos vessels to their own management.

Major Management changes after Aegean Petroleum disappoints with signficant earnings shortfall

Aegean Petroleum (ANW) with its unusual business model compared to its bunker supplier peer competitors has been courting trouble for a long time that is finally beginning to roost on is management.  The company reported much worse than expected earnings for 1st Quarter 2017. Its CEO John Tavlarios resigned.  Neither Tavlarios - as director - nor Peter Georgiopoulos as Aegean Chairman garnered enough shareholder votes to continue on the Aegean Board of Directors.  Aegean announced that they want to move to an asset light business model, effectively throwing in the towel and following their competitors’ business model.  In my mind, it was a miracle that they were able to continue their previous course for so long in this brutal, overly competitive, low margin business.

I have been warning for years on Aegean and its weak and incoherent business strategy.  See my previous posts.  Aegean Marine Petroleum Network: lagging competitors with low return on investment and mounting financial expense eroding earnings margins http://amaliatank.blogspot.gr/2013/01/aegean-marine-petroleum-network-lagging.html.

The marine bunker business has the worst earnings margins in the fuel business.  The competition is brutal.  The normal course of most marine bunker companies is eventually to sell out to competitor companies.  Aegean stock price performance – always below NAV - has been crying out for years that its shareholders would be better served by this path given that a merger with an established competitor like World Fuel would offer them better value. 

Many of the peer companies are arms of major commodities traders such as the case of Chemoil that was acquired by Glencore.  Others like World Fuels (INT) are highly diversified in the fuel business in other more profitable areas like fuel for land trucking and jet aviation.  They are companies that have low leverage and are able to finance their sales with ample working capital. 

Aegean followed an inherently Greek strategy to build up assets and leveraged up in the process with debt.  Their IPO was to acquire an owned fleet of double hull bunker vessels and somehow gain competitive advantage with this delivery system. Never mind that marine bunker supply is a trading business and these assets are cost to them as part of their delivery system in their sales to customers, making this a ludicrous strategy for competitive advantage.   

Why Aegean attracted so many major value investors is something that I find inscrutable.  I have done consulting work on Aegean over the years for some of them and the experience was disconcerting.  I discovered the most incredible misconceptions about Aegean.  Many actually believed that Aegean with its bunker vessels was another Greek shipping company with tankers instead of a bunker supplier!!!! They were shocked when I tried to bring them to reality of the Aegean business model and explain to them how the bunker fuel business works. 

Several years later under the urging of Aegean’s founder, Mr. Melissanides, who had some land in Fujairah, Aegean embarked upon a strategy of building oil terminals for its bunker oil to be sold to customers.   

Now liquid storage for third parties as a business Is normally more profitable with better returns than selling bunker oil or even transporting oil for third parties, but this was to acquire the physical commodity and then sell it to its customers in competition with its peer competitors.  The logic was along the same lines as its fleet of bunker tankers.  Adding these assets to the balance sheet as well as the bunker fuel inventory required additional financing, for which Aegean increased its leverage and finance costs. 

By comparison, Glencore – a major trading company – upon acquiring Chemoil started to divest of Chemoil storage facilities to lighten up the balance sheet on the logic that rented space would be cheaper and more efficient.  Moreover, peer competitor companies generally avoid physical bunker commodity, preferring to purchase from producers like major oil companies and hedge their sales to customers with derivatives.   They all fostered an asset light business model to support their bunker trading business competitively given the very low margins on sales.  Concurrently, they wanted to keep finance costs to a minimum. 

Aegean actively bought market share as a growth strategy and raised additional capital to do so.  Over time, Aegean got more and more bogged down with a heavy asset based balance sheet and aimless expansion without a coherent strategy for competitive advantage and better earnings margins. 

Personally, I give enormous credit to John Tavlarios that he managed as well as he did to hold on for so long given the extensive challenges that he faced with such an unproductive business strategy against a lean, brutal competition.  But these dramatic events where Aegean now publicly want  themselves to move to a more asset light business model that they have finally seen the light and thrown the towel here. 

Agile low-cost newcomers are cropping up in their major fuel hubs.  The market is saturated with back to back trading entities.  Aegean is going to have to start selling off its assets, deleverage and consider potentially exiting less profitable markets. 

The biggest jack asses in this mess are Aegean’s two largest shareholders  Canada’s Senvest Management and US-based Towle & Co. who bought into Aegean and are the largest shareholders.  They should have realized years ago the incongruities in Aegean with its asset heavy approach.  The case speaks for itself!  Hopefully, they will work themselves out of this to create some value for their investors.  Despite the challenges, I believe that Aegean shareholders could see better days with the management in the right hands.

Hunter Maritime Capesize acquisition deal flops

It is very surprising that a shipping acquisition deal promoted by the Saverys SPAC, Hunter Maritime and a major NY investment bank, Morgan Stanley would fall flat on its face with investors.  Saverys is a well-known and regarded figure in shipping circles.  Morgan Stanley is a major Wall Street investment bank that has done a lot of  high profile shipping deals.  What went wrong???

This deal was for the purchase of the 175,000-dwt Charlotte Selmer and Greta Selmer (built 2011), the 175,000-dwt Tom Selmer (built 2011), and the 175,000-dwt Lene Selmer and Hugo Selmer (both built 2010). They were all built by Chinese shipyard New Times Shipbuilding.  It was a pure asset deal, not the purchase of a going concern company.  

The originally announced price tag of US$ 139,4 million was higher than the US$ 123 million market valuation.  Eventually the price was reduced to US$ 133.5 million, still a rather hefty premium.   The deal hinged on completing a tender offer to buy back 8.2 million of its Class A common shares, roughly half of the shares sold to the public last year, at $10 per share.  Too many shares were tendered.  

Several knowledgeable sources explained that Investors hated this proposed deal.  Normally to induce SPAC investors to stay and recycle the investor base to de-SPAC, there has to be an acceptable arbitrage over the nominal US$ 10 share value.  The share buyback, moreover, was at par and gave shareholder nothing from it. The deal was poorly put together: small for a US$ 150 mio raise.  Even worse arbitrage and in a sub-sections that traded at a discount of P/Nav!!!  

Morgan Stanley is not considered by the Street a SPAC bank.  They appear to have fallen flat on their faces, unable to help Saverys/ Hunter recycle the shares nor assist in structuring the deal properly to be workable with shareholders in term of the share arbitrage. Why was Morgan Stanley not on the ball here???

Hunter has a 24-month deadline from its public offering last November to find potential acquisitions or return capital to its shareholders. The company said it is still looking for potential acquisitions.

Hanjin collapses into bankruptcy and receivership: Sursum Corda!

I have been predicting this sort  of high profile bankruptcy of a major liner company as inevitable for years now.  There are just too many loss making liner companies and sooner or later state support would reach its limits.  The whole matter of counterparty risk for the vessel provider companies has been misconstrued for years now on the false assumption that the liner companies were just too big to fail. 

Seaspan's Gerry Wang calls the Hanjin bankruptcy a nuclear bomb and mixing his metaphors a 'Lehman moment', but did not Wang see this coming?  For years, he was ordering aggressively and chartering out to loss makers like Hanjin.  His policies contributed to this!

This industry suffers from chronic overcapacity and low margins.  Further their business model based on China and head haul routes is in risk of becoming outdated with the slowing of Chinese growth and trade rebalancing as well as technologically obsolescent with the robotics, 3-D printing, etc.  I have always been in agreement with my friend Christopher Rex of Danish Ship Fund on this industry and its prospects. 

I have argued this time and again with my Wall Street investment bank friends. Hopefully, with this Hanjin case, they will start to wake up and understand better the container industry dynamics.  See some of my  blog articles on this subject over the years.  For example, I was very early to point out the large exposure of Danaos (NYSE: DAC) to financially weak liner companies. 

Danaos was somewhat fortunate with the HMM charters receiving shares in restructured HMM in return for reduced charter rates.  In the case of Hanjin, DAC has estimated exposure of US$ 560 million on Hanjin.  First estimates are creditor returns of 35% for secured claims. But only 5% for unsecured claims and zero on liquidation.  That is quite a mark down!

Over the years, Wall Street has made some bad shipping calls like the earlier reckless, irresponsible dry bulk speculative asset plays.  Investors in shipping stocks have frequently lost their shirts. 

Of course, the great thing about shipping markets as opposed to politics in the US and EU - where the usual reaction is to double up on failed policies, buy time and hide the truth from the public - is that you cannot hide financial losses, financial resources are limited and there are natural market corrections, asset write downs and consolidation.  Raw Schumpeter capitalism always prevails keeping the industry lean and mean over the long run, but not without significant volatility and market swings. 

It is not a good idea to get lost in the noise and ignore supply chain logistics that generates the underlying cargo demand for marine transport.